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
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CAMPAIGNS
OF THE
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO.

WITH
NOTICES OF THE RECENT WORK OF MAJOR RIPLEY.

BY
BREVET-MAJOR ISAAC I. STEVENS,
U. S. ARMY. =

NEW-YORK :
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
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TO
"THE MEN OF MEXICO"

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I. I. S.

PREFACE.

IN presenting these pages to the public, the writer relied much on manuscript notes, taken in the field and while the events were occurring. His object in appearing before the public was to testify to the services of those heroic officers and soldiers, who were in his judgment depreciated in the work of Major Ripley. He felt impelled to this course by a sense of duty ; and he appeals to all the actors in those scenes to bear testimony in vindication of the truth. Otherwise the work of Major Ripley will be considered authentic in all respects, and its authority will perpetuate many wrong views of these transactions. At the same time he thinks the work has much positive merit. It shows decided ability and promises well for the future. Should Major Ripley come to this task again, with powers matured by a few years more study and reflection, and with entire freedom from partisan feelings, there is no doubt his reputation as a military writer would be established, and his work appealed to as authority.

WASHINGTON, May 10th, 1851.

CAMPAIGNS

OF THE

RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO.

THESE pages have been occasioned by the publication of a recent work by Major Ripley, giving in great detail the events of the Mexican War.

The work is professedly critical, and much space is devoted to the discussion of the political and military movements of both Mexico and the United States. A very thorough exposition has been made of the plans both of campaigns and of battles. The style is decidedly good. The accuracy of the narrative we feel bound in general terms to commend. But we shall be constrained to differ from some of the military criticisms. Our own views we shall present with entire freedom. Our object is the vindication of the truth of History.

We shall leave to others the duty of a more critical exposition of the literary qualities of Major Ripley's work. We propose simply to examine his narrative of the cam-

paings of Taylor and of Scott; we shall at the same time present some general views in relation to our operations in Mexico; we shall touch upon the military genius and the military polity of our people; and we shall inquire into the causes of our wonderful success.

We particularly invite attention to his view of the origin of the war, a view we deem eminently just, and of which we will give the following summary.

Texas, by the battle of San Jacinto, established her separate existence and became acknowledged as one of the independent nations of the earth. In the exercise of an undoubted right, and by her own voluntary act, she became a member of the American Confederacy. This was declared just cause of war by Mexico, her minister was recalled, and preparations were made to appeal to arms. To meet this contingency the American Government threw a force into Texas, and assembled a fleet in the Gulf; to avert it, attempts were made to negotiate for the settlement of the questions in dispute. As regarded Texas, the only real question in dispute was one of boundary. With Mexico, however, the whole of Texas was at issue. The Sabine was the boundary claimed. The proposition to negotiate was met by the demand of withdrawing our fleet from the coast, our troops from the soil of Mexico. Thus a quasi state of war continued for many months. Finally, on the administration of Herrera intimating a willingness to negotiate, a minister actually proceeded to Mexico. He was not received, on the pretext that the proposition was to receive a special minister for the settlement of the Texas question only. This abortive attempt at negotiation led to a pronunciamiento by Paredes, and the overthrow of the administration of Herrera. And thus in the feverish, inflamed, unsettled state of the public mind of Mexico, it became apparent that stronger measures were necessary. Unwilling to resort at once to arms, which would have been

justified by the refusal of Mexico to receive our Minister, and by constant vaunts of her intention to make that appeal, it is resolved to make the bold political and military move of marching our tooops to the extreme verge of our claim; and in April our little army is encamped on the banks of the Rio Grande. Its positive effect was to bring to an end that worst of all states, a quasi war, and to make Mexico show her hand. It was hoped that, as a most significant expression of the determination of the American Government, it might induce the Mexican nation to negotiate. If resort were had to the alternative of arms, none of us at home, who knew the character of that little army, and the great qualities of its commander, for a moment doubted the result. By the act of Mexico the war was commenced. The splendid achievements of Palo-Alto and Resaca rudely dispelled the presumptuous hopes of the enemy, and fairly opened the campaign.

Thus this war was a political necessity, which, as it depended on causes beyond the control of the American Government, could be averted by no sagacity of theirs. These causes, not then well understood, are to be found in the unstable, ever-changing policy of Mexican administration; in that rule of faction which rent the land, and made it the prey of one military dictator after another; in that utter ignorance of the resources of its antagonist, which was characteristic of even its most enlightened public men. The moderation of our government, and the reiterated attempts to negotiate, were considered evidences of weakness. The clamors of opposition, it was fancied, would soon ripen into a pronunciamiento in their favor. The public mind could only be pacified by an appeal to arms. Mexico needed the sad experience of defeat and dismemberment, to be awakened to a sense of her international duties.

It was fortunate that at this juncture we had at the head of affairs so firm, so wise, so discreet a President as

Mr. Polk, ably seconded by that true-hearted patriot and statesman, Governor W. L. Marcy. Americans, through all time, can refer with pride to the unceasing endeavors to avert a hostile collision with a weak and neighboring republic, which, almost at the expense of proper self-respect, were made by our government. Not a lingering doubt can rest upon the fact, that we were urged to it by causes beyond our control, and that we entered upon it with clean hands.

Having thus been forced into the contest, it became the duty of the American government, in prosecuting it with energy, to demand indemnity for the past and security for the future. Not doubting that a few vigorous blows would end it, both our generals and statesmen were of opinion that operations should be pushed from the existing base of the Rio Grande. The object in view was not simply to terminate the present state of actual collision, but that previous, and more to be feared, condition of a quasi war, so unpropitious to the progress of a frontier state. It was resolved, in short, to "conquer a peace."

Before entering upon the narrative of the stirring events of the war, we will premise the following general views of the organization and disciplining of armies, some of which we find happily set forth in the work under consideration. The true military polity of a state provides for the most effective calling forth and organizing of its public force, to produce the greatest result against an enemy. It should grow out of the spirit and genius of the people, and be in harmony with all its institutions. Thus the science of war is based upon political as well as military considerations, and involves the thorough study of all the moral and intellectual energies of man. The army of a state should embody the heroic characteristics of its people, and be a noble representative of its varied resources and capacities. Its commander, to devoted patriotism and a consummate knowledge of his art, should add a thorough under-

standing of the political institutions of his country, and a comprehensive view of the problem of government. Mankind, not only in the embodiment of an army, but as united under governments, by alliances, as associated in neighborhoods and societies, and as expressed in individual action, should have been his grand study.

A public force thus organized and commanded, instinct with devotion to country, endowed with a noble humanity, moving as one man, will be terrible in battle, merciful in victory, friends and not oppressors to the people, upon whose hostile soil they march as conquerors.

The circumstances attending the settlement and progress of the people of the United States have developed, to a remarkable degree, those soldierly qualities essential to the rapid organization of an army. The whole progress of the country has been a war with the wilderness and the savage. Our whole history has been renowned for its peaceful conquests. Self-relying, rugged, indomitable; from earliest youth accustomed to the use of arms; with hands taught on the farm and in the workshop, ready for any new enterprise; with heads in many cases disciplined in severe schools of study,—no recorded people can so soon be converted into disciplined troops.

Thus it has become the established policy of the government to maintain in time of peace a small standing army in the highest state of discipline and efficiency, serving as a nucleus to that larger force to be called suddenly forth from civil life, whose peaceful mission, the conquest of the wilderness and the savage, is a fit preparation for the contingency of war.

The most complete vindication of the wisdom of this policy is to be found in the alacrity with which our citizens, at the breaking out of the Mexican war, flocked to the standard of their country, and endured the manifold ills of

a sickly climate and an unprepared field,—in the rapidity with which, in spite of want of organization and defects of discipline, they became reliable troops, and in the general constancy and good conduct they manifested in the various vicissitudes of the campaign.

Disciplined troops are far more effective, both for the multifarious duties of the campaign and the shock of battle, than hastily collected levies, whether under an organization of volunteers or additional regulars. Such troops are more amenable to discipline, suffer less from disease, are more patient and enduring under hardship, and more firm and undaunted in a perilous crisis.

It is therefore important, that the veteran standing force should be raised to that condition of numbers, discipline, and organization, as really to afford the means of imparting, in a short time, equal efficiency to the whole body of new troops. The veterans give steadiness, confidence, discipline to new troops, and new troops, in return, quicken the patriotism and enthusiasm of veterans.

On the occurrence of our difficulties with Mexico, the standing army was too small. A grave error had been committed in the army reduction of 1842, making the companies mere skeletons, and reducing the whole number of bayonets and sabres to less than eight thousand. This small force, moreover, had been disseminated through the country in small garrisons, a condition utterly unpropitious to high discipline and efficiency. There had been few general camps of discipline, where all arms had met together to learn the military art. In consequence of this system of petty garrisons, and this neglect of camps of discipline, regiments were deficient in the regimental drill, and practical instruction in evolutions of the line was almost unknown. The officers, though thoroughly educated at the military school, and anxious to master their profession, had been allowed few opportunities of experience and instruc-

tion, except in the subordinate details of the particular arm to which they were attached. The great body of the artillery even served as infantry. There were no engineer troops, and little or nothing had been done in the instruction of special arms, excepting the light artillery. The army had been regarded more as a police force to maintain forts, and guard our Indian frontier, than as an embodiment of the military skill and science of the country. A great portion of the rank and file were foreigners. There had been no legislation to bring a material into the army comparing favorably with that to be found in the several trades and occupations of civil life. The army contemplated in the military polity of the country had not been cherished by its legislation. No system had been adopted, considering the army as a whole, impressing each officer and each man with the spirit of his relations to it, and opening to all a professional career.

It must be considered as one of the most happy chances of this contest, that the troops who kept the flag of their country high advanced on the battle-fields of the Rio Grande, had been previously in training for this very emergency, in their six months' camp at Corpus Christi, and thus had been raised to a point of discipline and efficiency, which, with proper forecast on the part of the Government, might have been imparted to the whole army.

Grave errors, too, were committed in the mode of enlarging the public force, and in not taking a sufficiently extended view of the chances and vicissitudes of the campaign. There were three modes of enlarging the public force : 1st, By an extension of the frame of the old army, increasing the companies of the regiments to 24, organized in three battalions, as in the French service ; advancing all the officers, and filling the vacancies at the foot of the list by selections from civil life, and increasing the number of men in a company to 150. Thus would the veteran

organization have been more than quintupled, regiments and companies have been commanded by experienced officers, and a portion of the new troops have been saved from the privations and sufferings arising from the inexperience of new officers, who have to learn the making out of the ordinary returns, to say nothing of more important matters.* 2d, By adding new regiments of regulars. 3d, By calling out volunteers. We think the calling out of volunteers, organized in regiments officered by themselves, was a happy thought, in accordance with the spirit of our institutions, and as best calculated, in an emergency, to get troops promptly to the threatened point. But, conjoined with this, we think it was an oversight in not giving a greater increase to the regular force. One regiment of rifles and a company of engineer soldiers were added to the regular organization, and the number of privates in a company was raised to one hundred. With the expansion of the frame of the organization which we have indicated, and which has its analogies in foreign services, we should have provided for the emergencies which actually occurred, and which a wise forecast would have anticipated in embarking in a war. It would have increased the regular force to 50,000 odd, rank and file, the whole of which, with proper exertions, could have been raised in the summer of 1846; and which, allowing one-fifth at the *dépôts*, or *en route* for the seat of war, and one-fifth for the permanent sick-list, would have left three-fifths, or 30,000 regulars, for field service, at the beginning of the healthy season in the fall.

But the capital error of the government, and one for which it cannot be held blameless, consisted in not placing a proper confidence in the counsels of some of the ablest military men of the country—men who had devoted their lives to the military profession, and had seen service in former fields. Both the President and the Secretary of

War, experienced as statesmen, were totally inexperienced in military affairs ; and it was a violation of the plainest principles of administration, to endeavor to organize campaigns without reference to the views of those who had made campaigns their special study.. It was unfortunate that General Scott, altogether the ablest military man then known to the country, was not admitted to the confidence of the Executive, and the plan of campaign modified to suit his views. They did not suit, however, the impatient spirit of our government and people. Results were eagerly grasped at, and though sound policy approved the plan of seizing New Mexico and California, as indemnity for the war, yet the plan of General Scott, to call out the volunteers and place them in camps of instruction at home, should have been pursued. They would have acquired a respectable degree of discipline, have become inured to the privations of the field, and have thus been enabled to resist the inroads of disease in an unhealthy climate. In the mean time, information could have been obtained, dépôts established, means of transportation collected, and a plan of campaign could have been decided on. Had this course been pursued, when our army did move, one vigorous blow, one onward resistless march, and the contest would have been over. We do not say this in disparagement of the patriotic services of the President and his Secretary. We are not unmindful of the fact, that it is easy to write these things after the event. The claims of these high functionaries to the gratitude of their country lies in the fact, that they did pursue a practicable, energetic course, that they did apply with energy and success the public means to the prosecution of an inevitable contest, and that they availed themselves of the high state of exaltation of the public mind to enlist troops and send them to the field. It is just, however, to present their mistakes in an impartial view of this matter,

so that we may profit by our own blunders, the readiest mode of getting wisdom, both on the part of nations and of individuals.

On certain essential points there was a most happy union of sentiment between the government and the commanders of its armies. It was determined to conduct the war on the most humane principles, so that none of its calamities should fall on non-combatants. The laws of the State were enforced, its religion respected, the inhabitants protected in their property, their homes, and their lives. The troops were not permitted to live at free quarters. Every thing was purchased at a fair price. All violations of the law were promptly punished. In the hour of victory mercy was shown to the conquered, and kindness was lavished on the prisoner. The aim of all was to soothe and tranquillize the people, and to make them feel we were friends, and not oppressors. It was seen, from the nature of the contest, that this course promised the only hope of bringing the question to an amicable termination. It involved larger trains in forwarding supplies, so that we might not touch the sparse stores of the inhabitants, much delay in prosecuting operations; and the results were not apparently as rapid and brilliant as they would otherwise have been. It was also agreed in prosecuting the contest, that it was a cardinal point to maintain the highest possible ascendancy over the minds of the Mexican people, and that in consequence it was necessary that not only should we conquer in every encounter, but that after once having planted our foot, it should not be withdrawn. Every movement must be one of advance, which involved caution, and of course delay in movement.

Yet the disciplining of the troops, and the details of the campaign, are open to criticism. And first of all, we will premise the following observations: In war, troops should be kept actively employed, either in mov-

able columns, operating against the enemy, or in camps of discipline, learning the military art; and in a mild climate, as in Mexico, they should live under canvas, and be kept out of large cities, those Capuas to troops. Even the bulk of the garrisons of the cities should live outside the walls; key-points within being simply held by detachments from the main body, relieved daily. Thus the garrison will have all the mobility of a column, a greater prestige over the minds of the inhabitants, and be freed from those demoralizing influences, which the strictest discipline cannot counteract.

In operating against an enemy, it should be the study of the general to make the superiority of his troops felt in every particular: in rapidity of marches, aptitude for fatigue, patience under hardship, steadiness and confidence in vicissitude, as well as in the onslaught and the pursuit. With this view, from the first day of taking the field, every man should be put in training, as those were who contended for the honors of the Olympic games. Officers and men should, of course, be well instructed in the miscellaneous duties of the camp and march; but every effort should be made to invigorate the *physique*, and elevate the *morale*. The exercises should not be restricted to the drill. They should include marches ordinary and forced, and the encountering of obstacles met with in the field. They should be accustomed to carry burdens. With the Romans; the exercises of peace were more severe than those of war; and their soldiers rejoiced when they marched against an enemy. Every day should show an increase of physical and moral force.

The geography and resources of the country, moreover, require a careful examination, as they must necessarily modify the details of the campaign.

But mobility is the essential quality to be given to an army. It is better to run a little risk as regards food, cloth-

ing, and even the *materiel* of war, than so to encumber an army as to make it move at a snail's pace. In Mexico, we think, all the operations were somewhat faulty in the above respects. The six months' camp at Corpus Christi gave that spirit and character to the army, which caused it to triumph in its subsequent advance. In the march of General Wool, from San Antonio to Parras, the troops made their usual marches each day, and did not lose a man. In Puebla, our troops preparing for the advance were assiduous in their military exercises ; but at Vera Cruz—Jalapa—Puebla—Mexico—they were quartered in cities. This was unavoidable at Vera Cruz, but not so at the other places ; and throughout it was admitted, that a Mexican army had a mobility which could not be given to its antagonists. The Mexican troops are indeed remarkable for their rapid marches, and their patient endurance of hunger and fatigue. Ampudia, in four days, marched a division from Monterey to Matamoras, 180 miles. Santa Anna, after concentrating his troops about Encarnacion, moved early on the morning of the 21st of February, and after marching a distance of 36 miles across a desert without food or water, and finding the American troops in retreat, pushed his wearied army forward and came in presence of General Taylor about mid-day on the 22d ; his advance having marched some fifty miles in thirty hours, though with disastrous loss, both in men and *morale*. A portion of these same troops made a counter-march of seven hundred miles, and in fifty-five days were in position at Cerro-Gordo. Yet, notwithstanding these facts, we have no hesitation in expressing the conviction that, with the training we have indicated, an American army could be made to surpass the Mexicans, and indeed any army of ancient or modern times, in the rapidity of its marches, and in its patient endurance of all the toils of the campaign. But to attain this, a severe and constant discipline for many months is required ; and it

should be made the point of honor with the soldier, to excel his enemy in every requisite to success. It is a question worthy of consideration, too, whether pack-mules could not have been chiefly relied upon, as a means of transportation in prosecuting the first advantages, leaving the wagon trains to bring forward the larger supplies subsequently. Great mobility, too, could have been given to the movable columns, by organizing an efficient mule train. Had the contest continued, there is no doubt we could have made ourselves as great a terror to the enemy by our rapid marches, and by falling upon him unawares, as in the pitched battles.

We have already presented the military and political reasons for the march to the Rio Grande. General Taylor occupied a menacing position opposite Matamoras, and secured it by defensive works in the last days of April and the early days of May. The capture of Thornton's party left no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the Mexicans. General Taylor immediately made a requisition for five thousand troops. The country was thrown into the most intense anxiety for the safety of his command. But before reinforcements reached him, the enemy had been overcome in the well-contested fields of Palo Alto and Resaca, and driven across the Rio Grande.

Referring to our author for the narrative of these battles, we will state that in our opinion he does not do justice to the sagacity, promptitude, and judgment of the American commander. It would be inferred that General Taylor was wanting in decision, and that he had been worked up to his duty by the more energetic counsels of younger officers. General Taylor's whole course was well weighed, and was pursued with the most indomitable resolution. Major Ripley states, that on the morning of the 9th General Taylor was doubtful as to the propriety of an advance, and that, in consequence, he convened a council of war to discuss the ques-

tion. This is an entire mistake. General Taylor never hesitated for one moment, and he called the council simply at the instance of one or two of the senior officers who were opposed to the step. This council never had the slightest weight with General Taylor, as is apparent from the fact, that a large majority of the officers were opposed to an advance, and yet the advance was made. Moreover, it is stated, that only Duncan and Belknap were in favor of an advance. Justice to the dead requires it to be said that Cols. MacIntosh and Martin Scott were equally strenuous in favor of an advance—two gallant men who subsequently, on the bloody field of Molino, gave up their lives to their country. The march to the Rio Grande, the occupying a defensive position opposite Matamoras, and the return to Point Isabel, were all important steps in the plan of maintaining American ascendancy on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande. These flanking points made essentially secure, General Taylor marched directly forward to his object; and we know not which most to admire, his cool and steady encounter of the enemy on the field of Palo Alto, or the extraordinary and terrible energy with which he sent his little force to the attack of the Resaca. The one gave confidence to his troops and prepared them for the other.

Thus had the war unexpectedly arisen and been ushered in by the glorious victories of the Rio Grande. The necessary information upon which to base a large and systematic campaign was not collected, nor were there the supplies and means of transportation to advance with vigor into the interior. But both the General and the Government were of opinion that no delay should occur in striking another blow at the enemy. The President was particularly desirous to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the nation, and accordingly a large number of troops was sent out to the theatre of war. And whilst, in reference to ulte-

rior operations, neither the authorities at Washington nor the General in the field were able at once to settle upon a practicable plan, they both came simultaneously to the conclusion that Monterey, the capital of New Leon, the first position of strength on the highway to Mexico, and the key to the Northern provinces, should be promptly seized. It was hoped that when this was accomplished, the Mexican government would be ready to negotiate.

But the administration did not appreciate the difficulty of moving troops in an enemy's country; and amidst a sparse and impoverished population; nor did it consider that while it was an easy matter, with our immense steamboat facilities, to disembark reinforcements near the base of the Rio Grande, it was a work of time to organize the wagon trains to transport the same into the interior.

It would seem, indeed, that while so much vigor was shown in transporting troops to the Rio Grande, very little was exhibited in furnishing the means for transporting them after their disembarkation. It was the duty of the authorities to see that the usual supplies, means of transportation, &c., were sent with them, leaving it simply to the General in the field to make requisitions for unusual supplies and means of transportation. Thus, while some twenty thousand volunteers were sent to the theatre of war, not a wagon reached the advance of Gen. Taylor till after the capture of Monterey.

Gen. Taylor found himself in a situation of great embarrassment. Availing himself of the Rio Grande for forwarding supplies and troops by steam to a new dépôt at Camargo, he saw himself obliged either to make the movement on Monterey with the trains that had accompanied his advance from Corpus Christi, when his force was less than three thousand men; or else to defer his movement to so late a period, as to occasion serious dissatisfaction to the authorities at home.

But the question of subsistence is a controlling one in the movement of armies, and all the information that was gained went to show that only about six thousand men could be subsisted in the country about Monterey; moreover, this was the maximum force for which the American general could transport the munitions of war and subsistence indispensable before the occupation of the country placed in his hands its resources.

If, therefore, a movement were made at all, the column was necessarily restricted to that number, though a much larger force was at hand. Confident that it would be adequate to the single object of reducing Monterey, and concurring with the Government in the policy of vigorously prosecuting operations, Gen. Taylor determined upon advancing. Having arrived before Monterey, on the 19th of September, a vigorous reconnaissance was ordered of the various approaches, which resulted in the determination of Gen. Taylor to occupy the Saltillo road by Worth's veteran division, holding the remainder of the army in position on the eastern side of the town. Previous to arriving before Monterey, Gen. Taylor had contemplated a movement of this kind, with the view of intercepting reinforcements, and capturing the enemy's entire force. And, within twelve hours after his arrival, Major Mansfield, with a squadron of Texan horse, had gone over the whole distance to the Saltillo road, and had ascertained the entire practicability of the movement.

On the Saltillo side of the town were the two imposing heights of the Independence and Federation, defended by the respective works of the Bishop's Palace and old Fort Soldado. The possession of these works made certain the reduction of the city. Worth was put in movement on the 20th, and, to distract the enemy's attention, the remainder of the army was displayed on the eastern front of the city. Worth encamped about three miles from the Saltillo

road, and at daybreak the next morning resumed his march. After a sharp skirmish at the junction of the Saltillo road with the one he was pursuing, the enemy was repulsed and the Saltillo road was gained. Putting his train in a secure position on the Saltillo road, and disposing his troops for its protection, he made his arrangements to storm the heights of the Federation. Suffice it to say, that it met with the most complete success. Capt. C. F. Smith conducted the front attack against the heights with a chosen body of 300 men, while Col. P. F. Smith, with the 5th and 7th Infantry, directed another more to the south and west, directly against Fort Soldado itself. Col. Smith's movement, made on his own responsibility, against the Soldado, was in happy conjunction with that of Capt. Smith, made somewhat earlier, against the highest point, of the Federation. The garrison of Soldado, shaken by Capt. Smith's appearance on this height, was in no condition to resist the charge of the 5th and 7th. But before Worth's stormers had crowned the height of the Federation, the other side of Monterey had been penetrated, and a decisive triumph had been achieved over the main bulk of the enemy's force.

On the northern and eastern fronts of the city the ground was low, and the view obstructed by corn and chaparral. On the morning of the 21st, Gen. Taylor displayed his whole command, and ordered forward Major Mansfield and three battalions of Twiggs' division under Garland, to make a close reconnoissance of the enemy's works, and, if circumstances favored, to seize a position in the city itself. In the execution of this order, Mansfield, supported by two companies of Garland's command, cautiously advanced, and came upon an abandoned field-work, at only a stone's throw from some deserted stone houses in the suburbs, affording excellent cover for troops, and apparently giving access to the gorge of a redoubt on the ex-

treme left. This redoubt, called the Tannery Redoubt, was the key-point of the enemy's defences on this front of attack, and its possession was indispensable to the effective prosecution of operations.

Word was now sent to Garland to come on, and Mansfield moved down the street in search of a way to move to the left on the gorge. Before this was accomplished the whole command of Garland came into the suburb on the run, without suffering material loss, and pushing eagerly forward, became exposed to a severe fire from masked batteries beyond the San Juan. Mansfield still advanced with the companies of Backus and Lamotte, and a position was taken in a tannery, whence a severe fire was directed upon the gorge of the redoubt and upon another tannery which protected this gorge. But this attack was not supported, and Garland's command was withdrawn out of range, at the very moment the 4th Infantry and three regiments of volunteers under General Butler were sent to its support. These troops gallantly advanced upon the tannery redoubt; and its garrison, all the while severely pelted by Backus and Lamotte, immediately took to flight and crossed the San Juan. Operations were still further prosecuted, and attempts were made to storm the Tête de Pont, and a redoubt to the left of the tannery redoubt, but after experiencing considerable loss they were abandoned. No further attempts were made to effect a lodgment in the streets of the city. Garland's command was stationed as a guard to the tannery redoubt, and the remainder of the troops were withdrawn to the camp of San Domingo. This severe conflict, involving a loss of 394 men, killed and wounded, completely withdrew the attention of the enemy from the western front, and opened the way for Worth's success. It covered the time occupied by Worth from his movement in the morning to his seizing the height of the Federation.

On the 22d, Worth followed up his successes by the

storming of the Independence, closely followed by that of the Bishop's Palace. On the eastern front, the body of the enemy occupied their position of the previous day, and poured a storm of fire upon the tannery redoubt. A road thereto from the camp was constructed, entirely sheltering the troops from the flank fire of the Citadel, except for about the last hundred yards. The strength of the tannery redoubt itself was also increased by additional works.

In the night of the 22d and 23d, the enemy concentrated the bulk of his troops in the vicinity of the main plaza, and on the morning of the 23d, the troops on the eastern front occupied several of the works in the vicinity of the tannery redoubt. General Taylor directed the cautious advance of Quitman into the city. Quitman, by 2 o'clock, had approached to within a square of the plaza. But General Taylor, although he had been engaged full four hours, hearing up to this time nothing from Worth, concluded that no attack would be made by him during the day, and he accordingly withdrew the troops to the edge of the city, to concert a combined attack. Worth, notwithstanding, had been making his arrangements to attack the western portion of the city. He organized two parties, which, working from house to house with picks, made good every step of their advance. Towards nightfall Worth established the mortar which had been sent round from the other front, within effective distance of the heart of the city, and threw a shell into the main plaza every twenty minutes during the night.

On the morning of the 24th, a proposition to capitulate was submitted by Ampudia to the American General, and after several meetings on the part of Commissioners from the two parties, terms were agreed upon. The city and the military stores of the Mexican army were turned over to the Americans; the garrison marched out with the honors of war, retaining their arms and a field battery of six pieces; and an armistice of eight weeks was agreed

upon, subject to the approval of the respective governments.

Commending Major Ripley's narrative as in the main a perspicuous, graphic, and faithful account of these operations, we will express our dissent from some of his military views. In his criticisms upon these operations, he influence of the operations of General Worth are unduly magnified at the expense of those on the eastern front; thus enhancing the military reputation of General Worth, at the expense of that of General Taylor. General Worth in command of a division, and charged with an independent and most important operation, exhibited great skill and good conduct. He showed admirable executive qualities; care in providing for the safety of his trains, precautions against surprise, and skill in preparation for his multifarious enterprises. His combinations for carrying the heights of the Federation and Fort Soldado, the heights of the Independence and the Bishop's palace, were happily conceived, and boldly executed. Too much praise cannot be ascribed to his cautious, and yet sustained vigorous advance into the city.

But it must be borne in mind, that it was General Taylor to whom the merit of the conception of this flank movement of Worth was due, and that, thoroughly understanding the character of his enemy, he omitted no precaution to secure its complete success. His bold attack upon the city on the morning of the 21st, gaining an important work, and his unflinching attitude throughout that day, and the succeeding day, in the teeth of the main force of the enemy, and under the incessant fire of his heavy guns, not only was Worth's safety on the Saltillo road, but it absolutely disorganized that quarter of the city of a great portion of its defenders, and required of Worth at no time to put forth half the strength of his division. This combined movement against the common enemy, caused all the heights and

defences of the western front to fall into the hands of Worth, with small loss to his division.

Moreover, on the 23d, Gen. Taylor, by his early, bold, and consecutive movements, continued to withdraw the enemy's attention from Worth, and enabled the latter to establish himself securely in the western suburb of the city, without seriously encountering the enemy. Though we think Gen. Worth deserving of censure for his procrastination in responding to Taylor's attack in the early part of the day, he is to be commended highly for continuing his advance in the latter portion, after Taylor's fire had ceased and his troops had been withdrawn. It must also be admitted, that, as regards the details of operations in the city, the eastern attack was not characterized by the skill and caution of the western attack. Thus, on the 21st, we think, there were movements subsequent to the taking of the tannery redoubt, which were unnecessarily rash and headlong, and that the suburb previously occupied should have been subsequently held and secured by works. We think the mortar, instead of having been sent round to Worth, should have been established in that redoubt immediately on its fall. Shells thrown therefrom into the enemy's lines, would have done much towards silencing his fire on the 22d. Instead of restricting operations on the 22d to the occupation and strengthening of the works of the tannery redoubt, ground northward and westward should have been gained and secured by lodgments, with a view of opening a communication with Worth and of isolating the citadel.

On the third day, Worth being in possession of the opposite heights, and the way being open for his entrance into the city, Gen. Taylor should early have sent an order to Worth to advance with promptitude. There would have been no difficulty in sending the order. At all events, his own troops should not have been withdrawn. With early

notice sent to Worth, and decisive orders for his prompt advance, a communication must have been established towards night.

Exposed as Gen. Taylor's column was to the close fire of the enemy's main force, it was important that his successive advances should have been secured by works.

We will remark, however, there was a great deficiency of intrenching tools, due to the limited amount of transportation, and that all the operations at Monterey were greatly influenced, both by this cause and the entire want of breaching guns.

Major Ripley enlarges much upon the dangerous character of the flank movement executed by Worth. To which we reply: Gen. Taylor knew his enemy; he also knew the reliable character of Worth and Worth's division. The operation promised large results, without hazard of disaster or unnecessary loss. It was made perfectly safe by Taylor's prompt conduct in first displaying his troops, and sending large corps of cavalry towards the western suburb, with orders even to charge through the open streets, should circumstances favor, whilst Worth was in movement; and, second, in his stern attack on the city, while Worth was making his dispositions to do the work assigned to him.

Major Ripley also censures the eastern attack, for being made under the flank fire of the citadel, and without a proper knowledge of the ground. To which we reply: The citadel was a strong field-work, defended by a formidable stone keep. Two breaching guns, designed for the attack on the city, had been left behind, in consequence of the small amount of transportation rendering it utterly impossible to take them along. The enemy were greatly superior in heavy guns. The citadel could only have been taken by an infantry assault, which would have been, in a military sense, almost madness, and

could only have succeeded at at an enormous sacrifice of life. Time pressed. Boldness and rapidity could alone insure success. The safety of the army was in decided action and in prompt results; although some loss and some hazard were incurred in disregarding the citadel, there would have been more by delaying the attack on the city and carrying the citadel. It was impossible to get information of the eastern works, without bringing a portion of the command into action; and though the ardor of the troops brought the whole force of Garland into close action before the reconnoissance was accomplished, it may be just cause for censuring subordinates, but not the directing general. Taylor's orders to Garland and to Mansfield to examine the enemy's position, and, if circumstances favored, to seize a point in the city, we pronounce to be emphatically wise and proper. His promptitude, on hearing the report of arms, in advancing the remainder of his troops, saved Backus in his gallant stand in rear of the tannery redoubt, entirely isolated in consequence of the withdrawal of Garland, and resulted in wresting a strong position from the enemy, and driving him beyond the San Juan. His general dispositions and orders were just and urgently demanded, in view of the movement of Worth.

We cannot see how General Taylor could have made a better general plan for his operations against Monterey, or a better general disposition of his troops. Nor will it be denied that his operations as a whole were characterized by vigor, boldness, and judgment. Upon these considerations must rest the vindication of his qualities as a commander.

We now come to the capitulation of Monterey, and feel bound to express our entire dissent from Major Ripley's views.

General Taylor, though in the first instance disposed to insist upon the surrender of the Mexican army as prisoners

of war, finally agreed to the capitulation for the following reasons :

1. His army was not large enough to make a complete investment of the city, and he could not prevent the enemy evacuating it during the night.

2. He was assured by General Ampudia that the new Mexican administration was favorable to negotiations, and he was induced to grant the mild terms of the capitulation providing for an eight weeks' armistice, in the belief that it would be an auspicious entering upon a more friendly intercourse between the two governments, and would end in a treaty of peace.

3. Considerations of humanity to non-combatants.

The difficulty with Major Ripley's criticisms, as indeed with the criticisms of all who have censured General Taylor for this capitulation, is, that in discussing the terms and measuring the advantages of the capitulation, sight has been lost of the fact that a most signal triumph was achieved, and an important point gained. The Mexicans, in agreeing to a capitulation, acknowledged most significantly the prowess of the American army. The expedition was limited to six thousand men, for the simple reason that a larger force could not be transported to, and subsisted in the valley of the San Juan. It is admitted, that a more formidable resistance was encountered than was anticipated. Does this sustain our author's statement, that the expedition was chiefly an experiment on the agricultural capacity of the San Juan; that its object was statistical and not military? This idea has its refutation in the bold, prompt, resolute going to work of the American General; in his stern, vigorous blows, compelling the enemy to seek the cover of his works on the first day of the attack; and in all his subsequent movements. We think that General Taylor deserves high praise for his vigor and foresight in so prosecuting operations, that the enemy agreed to ca-

pitulate, instead of resorting to the evacuation of the city.

The real alternative is this : did General Taylor judge rightly as a military man, and therefore does he deserve well of his country for advancing when he did advance, and accomplishing what he did accomplish? Or ought he to have remained on the Rio Grande four to six weeks longer, in order that he might organize the necessary means to raise his expedition to 10,000 or 12,000 men? This, it seems to us, is the real and only alternative.

The result therefore of the operations against Monterey was its capitulation, and the withdrawal of the Mexican force. But in consequence of the known fact that a change of administration had occurred in Mexico, and the assurances of the Mexican General that the new rulers were friendly to negotiations, the political measure of an eight weeks' armistice was determined upon, for the purpose of giving the Mexican Government an opportunity to treat for peace. Major Ripley errs in treating this armistice as a military necessity, growing out of the inadequate means of the American General ; whereas it was a question of state, which, under the new circumstances of the case, General Taylor felt authorized to entertain ; and to entertain the more readily, because it could not interfere in the slightest degree with a forward movement, the alternative of failure in negotiations, and to prepare for which he well knew would require the whole period covered by the armistice.

The practical sagacity of General Taylor in this measure is displayed in his never having for a moment intermitted his exertions to prepare for the advance, and in the armistice itself never having paralyzed in the least his operations.

Although we think it probable that the Mexican army would have surrendered prisoners of war, we nevertheless think that General Taylor acted wisely in agreeing to

the capitulation. He could not have foreseen Mexican facility in giving assurances that were not to be fulfilled. Our object was to conquer a peace. How could this be accomplished if we rejected all overtures from the enemy, on the ground they could not be trusted? With such a principle we might have subjugated the country, but manifestly it would have been impossible to treat for peace.

About the time of the reduction of Monterey, the Government was directing its attention to operations in another quarter, and our author, in his endeavor to account for the policy of initiating the Vera Cruz expedition, has in our judgment fairly presented neither the military views and recommendations of Gen. Taylor, nor the main historical facts of this most interesting period of the Mexican war. In general terms, he sets forth the statement that Gen. Taylor, in reply to the many inquiries of the Government as to the proper mode of prosecuting operations, was deficient in enlarged views; that his counsels were simply limited to objections; and that the Administration, finding they could get nothing out of him, were obliged to act without regard to him. The facts are simply these. Their simple recapitulation will show the important part played by Gen. Taylor even in the Vera Cruz expedition, and the concurrence of opinion that subsisted between Marcy, Scott, and Taylor, in reference to setting on foot and prosecuting that expedition. We will give them without reference to authorities, but we challenge contradiction.

Gen. Taylor from the outset was of opinion, that operations from the Rio Grande should be restricted to cutting off the Northern Provinces. In reference to the simple operation of reducing Monterey, he was uniformly of opinion that six thousand men were adequate. Whether San Louis Potosi should be included under the general class of Northern Provinces, he declined giving an opinion, till more accurate information could be gained by advancing upon

and reducing Monterey. Previous to the advance to Monterey, he had thought it probable that a column of 10,000 men advanced to San Louis Potosi would bring proposals of peace, but after the advance he was of opinion that 20,000 men would be requisite—that this number could not be pushed forward—that this advance must be abandoned and a defensive line occupied,—and that the decisive blow must be struck against the capital from the neighborhood of Vera Cruz. He early expressed the opinion that a movement upon the capital from Tampico was impracticable.

The Secretary on his part concurred fully in the opinion, early expressed and uniformly maintained, as to the extent of operations from the base of the Rio Grande. He shared equally with the general, his hopes and his fears in reference to an advance upon San Louis Potosi. He hoped, as did the general, that such an advance might be practicable, and that it might terminate the war. Both the Secretary and the General, when it was seen that the change of Government brought with it no hopes of negotiating a peace, came to the conclusion that the decisive blow against Mexico should not be struck from the Northern line. Their respective letters announcing this conclusion passed each other on their way to their several destinations. This change of rulers was a grand political element that controlled the military operations. Major Ripley will find in this new element a conclusive reason for the change of opinion of Gen. Taylor, after the reduction of Monterey, as to the force that would be adequate to occupy San Louis Potosi. In August, when he expressed the opinion that 10,000 men were adequate, it was believed the Northern Provinces, including San Louis Potosi, were hostile to the general government, and would be disposed to welcome our advance. In October, affairs were entirely changed. The Government had gone into the hands of more energetic rulers, and the

whole country was united in one sentiment of hostility and resistance to American conquest.

The War Department, in a dispatch to Gen. Taylor of the 22d September, announced the rejection of overtures for negotiating a peace by the Mexican Government, and the determination of the American Government to prosecute the contest with vigor, and on the 22d October that an expedition against Vera Cruz was resolved upon. At this time no ulterior views beyond the reduction of Vera Cruz seem to have been entertained by the Secretary, and 4000 men was the force suggested as adequate to this service in connection with the navy. But for definite and large views, both as regards the whole field of operations in Mexico, and the particular objects and organization of this expedition, the country is mainly indebted to Gen. Scott. He now seems to have been taken into the confidence of the Government. In a memoir addressed to the Secretary on the 27th October, he showed that the possession of Vera Cruz and its castle, as a step towards compelling Mexico to sue for peace, was of no value, unless promptly followed by a march upon the capital. Ten thousand men he deemed the minimum force to attempt the reduction of the city, to be increased to 20,000 men on opening the campaign. In subsequent memoirs of the 12th and 16th November, he proposed prosecuting a great campaign with 30,000 effectives, to be organized in advance of Monterey and at Vera Cruz, in two columns of ten and twenty thousand men, and to operate respectively upon San Louis Potosi, and the capital. These memoirs are masterly. We think no one need do more than carefully read them to satisfy himself why the Government a few days afterwards sent the Commander-in-Chief of the army to the field, with full powers to organize both lines according to his own best judgment. And it was not till this decisive step had been taken, that the

Government was placed in possession of Gen. Taylor's plan of the campaign ; which was to assume a defensive attitude on the northern line, and to strike the decisive blow from Vera Cruz on the Capital with an army of 25,000 men.

Gen. Scott's plan we deem admirably adapted to the present conjuncture of affairs in Mexico. The great leader of Mexico was now at the head of its armies. Ten thousand effectives in advance of Monterey would have resisted any offensive movements, with the large force he was now organizing at San Louis Potosi. If Santa Anna remained in observation at San Louis Potosi, Gen. Scott would have advanced almost unresisted upon the capital. If he detached, and he must have detached largely if he detached at all, Gen. Taylor would have advanced almost unresisted upon San Louis Potosi. And with 20,000 men, Gen. Scott could have overcome any Mexican force, whether in the open field, or behind defensive works. Detachments would probably have been made, and the whole Mexican army, and the two strong points of the North and the South of Mexico, would have succumbed to our arms. Menacing columns operating from these points must have prevented any further organization of the public force of Mexico, and no alternative would have remained than to sue for peace. The question was emphatically one of moral ascendancy, and bold consecutive movements on two converging lines were calculated to produce the greatest impression on the excitable Mexican mind.

General Taylor's plan we deem an eminently safe and practicable plan—and though not so imposing and complete as that of General Scott, and not calculated to produce as large results, yet requiring a smaller force, it was more in accordance with the state of American preparation, and was in the sequel adopted.

We prefer obvious, simple, natural explanations of acts

and motives to possible hypotheses, however ingenious they may be. And therefore we do not believe with Major Ripley, that as regards Scott and Taylor, the question had now become personal; that each was fixed on his own special part without reference to the general good. We do not believe that General Scott went to the field to play a monopolizing part; nor do we believe that General Taylor had a thought that did not harmonize with the most single-minded devotion to his duty and his country.

The administration was impelled to its course by high national considerations. It was its paramount duty, as it was its evident interest, to organize victory. A crisis had indeed occurred, demanding that all the military ability of the country should be applied to the direction of its military force. The presence of General Taylor on the northern line was needed whilst the Vera Cruz expedition was going forward. A strong force was assembling in his front, and whether our troops operated offensively, or remained in observation, a wary and experienced commander, having a knowledge of the country and possessing the confidence of his troops, was imperiously required. What other course could the administration have taken than to send Scott to the new field, and continue Taylor in the command which he had so long and so ably filled?

To organize this campaign, nine additional regiments of volunteers had then been called out. 20,500 effectives was General Taylor's estimated force. General Scott proposed detaching 4,000 regulars and 5,500 volunteers from the northern line for the expedition against Vera Cruz—leaving 11,000 men to General Taylor, and 8,000 for a movable column in advance of Monterey. Two thousand two hundred and fifty new volunteers sent to the northern line would increase this movable column to more than 10,000. His own force—9,500 men drawn from General

Taylor, 4,500 new volunteers and 1000 sailors and marines adequate to the reduction of Vera Cruz—was to be increased to 20,000 effectives by new regiments of regulars in season for a movement into the interior.

Throughout the Mexican war the effective force in the field was greatly overrated. Nor was the estimate of General Scott an exception to this fact. Thus General Taylor's effective force did not exceed at the moment of writing this memoir 16,000 men.

The toils and hardships of the first campaign, without including casualties in battle, will, in a distant and untried theatre, reduce the effective force of regulars to three-fourths or four-fifths, and of volunteers to one-half or two-thirds of the original number. To have insured a column of 10,000 effectives in advance of Monterey, and one of 20,000 throughout the Vera Cruz campaign, estimating the force to keep open the northern line at 3,000 men, required an additional force of 10,000 volunteers and 12,000 regulars. And 15,000 additional volunteers would have been required to supply the places of the twelve months' men, whose terms of service would expire before midsummer, and who could not be expected to re-enlist, and giving an aggregate of 25,000 volunteers and 12,000 regulars. The force actually called out was 8,000 volunteers, and 8,500 regulars. We do not take into the account 6,500 volunteers called out in April, and at so late a period as neither to be able to supply the place of the discharged volunteers till months after their return, nor to be of any use in the campaign in question.

With such inadequate means therefore was the government proposing to conduct a large campaign. And the consequence was that the shock of battle had to be borne by half the numbers originally contemplated. Great risk of disaster was incurred on both lines. Impossibilities

almost were attempted, and impossibilities almost were achieved.

Meanwhile, General Taylor proceeded to organize his defensive line. Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, was seized. The Chihuahua expedition was abandoned, and General Wool was placed in position at Parras, and early in January, General Taylor brought together a force of five thousand three hundred men at Victoria, the capital of Tamaulipas, to occupy that position, examine the passes of the mountains, and have in readiness two thousand regulars and two thousand volunteers for the Vera Cruz expedition. On the 15th of January, he received General Scott's letters of the 3d inst., addressed respectively to himself and General Butler, directing 9000 men to be detached for this purpose. The occupation of Victoria was abandoned, and all the troops were sent to Tampico, save the escort required by the General to accompany his return to Monterey.

General Scott, on reaching Camargo on the 3d of January, estimated General Taylor's force at 7000 regulars and 10,000 volunteers, and deeming 2000 regulars and 5000 volunteers sufficient to occupy a defensive line, he proposed detaching 4500 regulars, 4500 volunteers, and two field batteries, leaving to General Taylor 2500 regulars and 5500 volunteers. The troops actually placed at his disposal, General Butler acting from information somewhat imperfect in reference to the number of regular and volunteer troops at Victoria and Tampico, were, in round numbers, Gen. Worth's column 2,700 strong, and Gen. Patterson's at Tampico 6,000 strong, or about 5,100 regulars and 3,600 volunteers, leaving to Gen. Taylor less than a thousand regulars and 7,300 volunteers; of which one company of artillery and the Maryland battalion were left in garrison at Tampico, and giving to the Northern line proper, say 900 regulars and 7000 volunteers, an aggregate of 7,900 men.

Thus, though the aggregate force rather exceeded Gen. Scott's estimate of what was needed to defend the line, there was not so large a regular force as was desirable or as Gen. Scott in the first instance contemplated. At the instance of the War Department and in view of the character of the force, Gen. Scott strongly advised Gen. Taylor to retire upon the defensive position of Monterey.

The problem to be solved was a somewhat difficult one, and it must be admitted that neither of the American Generals found its complete solution.

Both were of opinion, up to the last moment, that Gen. Santa Anna would countermarch, and resist the landing at Vera Cruz; yet both saw the necessity of providing against an advance movement from St. Louis—Gen. Scott by advising the retiring upon Monterey, and making the stand with the aid of its strong defences; Gen. Taylor by advancing and assuming a threatening attitude at the very edge of the desert, and giving battle before the enemy could recover from the fatigue of his exhausting marches.

Scott's plan, whilst it insured the safety of Gen. Taylor's command, exposed his own enterprise to imminent peril. Had Gen. Taylor retired upon Monterey, Santa Anna would not have followed him. Against its strong defences with an army of six thousand five hundred men, he could have made no impression. But Saltillo abandoned, Santa Anna could have so exalted the impressionable Mexican mind that, leaving Taylor intact, and rapidly countermarching, he could have brought 40,000 men into the lines of Cerro Gordo. Santa Anna even coined a victory out of the sad retreat from Buena Vista. What could he not have done, coming back to the Capital as the deliverer of the State of Coahuila? For these reasons we consider Gen. Scott's plan of retiring upon Monterey as equivalent to a defeat, and that the abandonment of the Vera Cruz expedition would have been infinitely preferable.

We think, therefore, that Gen. Taylor judged rightly in holding his position in advance of Saltillo. It maintained the *prestige* of the American arms, and was worth all the risk incurred.

The truth was, our means were entirely inadequate to maintain our acquisitions on the Northern line, and to open a new line of operations. Could the delays in raising the new volunteers and regulars have been foreseen, we think the decision should have been to restrict operations to the Northern line. The amount of transportation collected on that line was already large,—1200 wagons. It could in two months have been largely increased. The country would no doubt have furnished several thousand pack mules. Three thousand actually accompanied the march to Monterey. The effect of a movement on San Louis would have been to relieve our rear. Santa Anna would have called in his advanced parties to its defence. Fifteen hundred men could in the first instance have maintained our whole rear from Tampico to Saltillo.

Early in March, with simply the diligence exhibited throughout this campaign, the advance could have been made from Saltillo with 19,000 men with ample means of transportation, and the great battle of the war could have been fought under the walls of San Louis Potosi. In the mean time the remaining regiments of new volunteers could have sufficiently increased the force in rear, and converged a large train for the troops at San Louis by the circuitous route of Monterey. Tampico could have been made in part the base, the mule-paths leading thence to San Louis serving for the reinforcements of foot and transportation by pack mules. With scarcely a pause in its movement, our army could have advanced upon the capital, leaving a large garrison at Queretaro. Thus in forty or fifty days from the movement in advance of Saltillo, the whole centre

of the country could have been firmly seized and the enemy been reduced to sue for peace. Had he still held out, the line with Vera Cruz could have been opened in the fall.

Thus, operating on this long, circuitous and difficult line would have been safer and more practicable than were the operations on the Vera Cruz line, in consequence of the utter inadequacy of our means. Nor could the army have possibly been involved in any conflict with the enemy of the fearful character of the great contest of Buena Vista, or the terrible battles of Mexico.

Both the Secretary and General Scott indulged the hope, that the two columns would at least be raised to 20,000 men, and that the capital and San Luis would have been seized, and a peace have been conquered by the time the terms of service of the old volunteers had expired. General Scott left Washington with this confident belief. His plan of the campaign was an admirable one, and promised large results. He was unwilling to relinquish it, notwithstanding that from day to day, the inadequacy of his means became more and more apparent. He persevered, and success on both lines crowned our arms.

This result was due, under Providence, to the qualities of our two leaders. General Taylor, left with a force simply adequate to maintain a defensive position at Monterey, determined to surrender none of his acquisitions. His bold position at the edge of the desert in advance of Saltillo, invites the attack of the Mexican leader, and the consequence is, that that admirable army, the best Mexico ever saw, is defeated, demoralized, and reduced to half its original numbers. This was the most effective aid rendered to the Vera Cruz expedition. Had it not been for the battle of Buena Vista, Scott could not have advanced upon the capital.

Nor was Scott's undertaking less bold and dangerous.

He approached Vera Cruz in the full expectation of finding Santa Anna ready to receive him with an army of 20,000 or 30,000 men. His own force did not exceed 13,000, and it is a matter of record, that he was determined to attempt the landing with 8,000, whatever force might be opposed to him. Thanks to the events on the northern line, his landing was unresisted.

Yet we find that, delayed for many months by the want of troops, and after a preparation for resistance even greater than what he had anticipated, he finally advances upon the capital with 10,000 instead of 20,000 men.

The event shows that the distribution made by Scott was most fortunate. Five hundred more men could not have made the victory of Buena Vista more decisive. It might have made the valley of Mexico the magnificent mausoleum of the American army. Be it remembered, it was the large, profound, disinterested view of his field of operations by General Taylor, his noble confidence in himself, his extraordinary soundness of judgment and energy of will, that led to meeting the enemy on that memorable field, and that led to that signal triumph. It was the genius and enterprise, the indomitable resolution and heroic spirit of Scott, that led to the advance upon and capture of Mexico.

Whilst General Scott was organizing his own expedition, and Taylor was maintaining his defensive attitude in advance of Saltillo, General Santa Anna, the American plan having been discovered to him by the capture of General Scott's dispatches of January 3d, resolved upon a campaign equalling in greatness of conception the most masterly of Frederick's, and which, had it been successful, would have placed him high on the roll of the masters of the military art. It was to launch his whole force in succession against the two columns into which our army was now divided, and by one great effort, to drive from the soil

of Mexico the armies of her invaders. It being doubtful whether he could reach Vera Cruz in season to resist the landing of General Scott's column, his first movement was of necessity against General Taylor. No where else could he be so sure of bringing a preponderating force to bear upon his enemy.

The great want of Mexico was a victory, and the restoration of her moral power. The northern line broken up, and the American army driven beyond the Rio Grande, the full deliverance of Mexico would have been wrought. One victory achieved, the memory of former defeats would have been wiped away, and Mexico would have been placed in a position stronger than the one she occupied before the battle of the Rio Grande. The whole nation would have been raised to the highest pitch of enthusiasm; and the column moving upon the capital would have had to encounter, in firm and disciplined array, the entire military strength of Mexico, directed by its great chief. The veterans of the North, flushed with recent victory, would have given confidence to every soldier of the line, and the whole army would have been an army of veterans. Thus this movement was the great bow of promise to Mexico, and we think the Mexican general, if he determined to resist at all, could not, in any other way, have so wisely applied his force.

It was the misfortune of Mexico throughout this war to be beaten, and the vindication of this movement consists in the fact, that it was the only one which came near being successful. Buena Vista was won by policy, by skill, by fortune. It was General Taylor's bold attitude for several weeks at Agua Nueva that restored confidence to his own troops, shaken by many previous rumors, and that imparted to them additional skill and discipline. It was his apparently precipitate retreat from this position, that lured the Mexicans on to that unprepared attack, with troops exhausted by fifty miles continuous march, still suf-

fering from thirst and hunger. It was that clear eye that saw that *here* must the victory be achieved if achieved at all—that iron will that would not swerve from this conviction—that unabated confidence that all would yet go well, that made our troops so nobly sustain their chief. All these have made Buena Vista the pride of every patriot and the theme of history.

We do not propose to go into any further detail in relation to the battle of Buena Vista. With such evidence, on all sides, of the great ability of the general in chief command, the large facts all thoroughly weighed and all correctly understood, we have really not the space in this brief article to notice errors of detail. No doubt many occurred, and we have yet to learn that battles can be fought and won even without the commission of large errors.

We accord to our author the general accuracy in his narrative of these operations, and we approve of many of his military criticisms.

We think he has stated with great force and eloquence the reasons for Santa Anna's march upon Gen. Taylor, and we concur in his general views as to the defensive line. Our troops were too much disseminated. Wool's force should have been drawn in from Parras and a threatening attitude assumed at Agua Nueva immediately on the occupation of Saltillo. Had the war sunk into a quasi peace, as was proposed by many of our public men, by the occupation of a defensive line, we think San Louis Potosi should have been seized as essential to its security. It was the key-point of the whole line. It was not essential however, after the Vera Cruz line had been opened and the attention of the enemy had been fixed in that direction.

We think, however, the author does injustice to both Generals in asserting that the resources of the country was the bone of contention between them: that their views were partial, and that each was fixed on his own line. On

the contrary, their whole course was of a very different character.

It is admitted that they did not altogether foresee the future, and that in particular they did not appreciate the consummate ability of Santa Anna. Yet we find a remarkable disinterestedness on the part of both. Taylor advised the suspension of offensive operations on his own line where he had every thing to gain, and the opening of a new line, where the victor's crown was to be placed on the brow of another. Scott anxiously sought the safety of the command of Taylor, preferring to expose his own force to the jeopardy and disaster involved in the change of the plan of campaign. We have given our reasons why we think Gen. Scott erred in advising a withdrawal to Monterey, and why we consider Taylor's course was more fortunate for his country. A careful examination will show that Scott acted in a most generous and disinterested spirit. This view is confirmed by his course, when he believed Santa Anna was in movement from San Louis to meet him at Vera Cruz—a movement which, most assuredly, in our opinion, would have been made had Taylor retired to Monterey. He must have believed his own enterprise difficult and his own force inadequate, yet we find him making no further detachments from Taylor's command, but on the contrary his aim was to reinforce Gen. Taylor by new regiments of volunteers, to enable him to assume the offensive. We see throughout a great anxiety on the part of Scott to leave sufficient troops with Taylor to enable him thus to act. Gen. Scott was true throughout to his original plan of the campaign, wherein Taylor was to act a conspicuous part.

The evidences which our author adduces to establish the fact that General Taylor was governed by personal views proves to our mind the very reverse. Taylor did feel aggrieved in seeing 9,000 troops detached from his

command, without any previous consultation, after he had reported that he could not spare more than 4,000, and he must have been more than human, not to have felt aggrieved.

Yet it is remarkable with what singleness of purpose he at once adjusted himself to the new condition of things. In the words of Scripture, instead of looking back to the things that were behind, he pressed forward to the things that were before. It made him feel strong, and he therefore announces to his government his ability to maintain his position. Such is the legitimate fruit of the spirit of self-abnegation—the true heroic spirit. Who dreamed at this time of advancing upon the capital with 10,000 men? Yet it was done this same year by men raised in like manner to a consciousness of power and moved in like manner to the determination to exert it.

Had General Taylor, after his troops were withdrawn, expended his strength in clamoring about it, instead of devoting himself to his great work of maintaining his position, his former views would have been sustained by his own destruction. There is no inconsistency between his first opinion that only 4,000 men could be detached with safety to his command, and his subsequent expression of confidence, that though 9,000 men were detached, he could still maintain his line; and in charging this upon General Taylor, we think our author has not shown that appreciation of the influences of moral causes in shaping great events, which generally characterizes his work.

Meanwhile General Scott was organizing his own expedition, and in March, landed in the vicinity of and invested Vera Cruz. But before proceeding with the narrative of his campaign, we feel bound to give certain extracts from dispatches in illustration of the spirit with which he entered upon his duties. We think the practical effect of Major Ripley's work is to represent General Scott as having

rushed to the field simply to share the harvest of glory with Taylor, and to regain his former prestige before the people. His dispatches, however, give a very different aspect to the case. Their uniform tenor exhibits in the most convincing light the single-mindedness with which he sought to serve his country in the field, and the remarkable steadiness and force with which, in spite of manifold difficulties, he pushed forward to his object. They exhibit him in his true character in times of emergency—a calm, steadfast, indomitable, enterprising, noble-minded man, whom his country should delight to honor, and whom posterity will not fail to revere. We extract as follows :

Oct. 27th, 1846.—In a memoir to the Secretary of War, General Scott says : “ An army of at least 10,000 men, consisting of cavalry, (say) 2,000 men ; artillery, (say) 600, and the remainder infantry. The whole of the artillery, and at least half of the cavalry and infantry, ought to be regular troops. * * * By this time, (say in the month of March) that army might be augmented to about 20,000 men for ulterior operations, by new regiments of regulars and volunteers.”

Nov. 12th, 1846.—“ The minimum force, (10,000 men) then proposed, I still deem indispensable. Personally, I would be willing to attempt the capture of Vera Cruz and through it the castle of San Juan Ulloa with perhaps a smaller army, aided by the blockading squadron of that coast. But I very much doubt whether the government ought to risk the expedition, under any commander, with a land force less than 12, perhaps 15,000 men. To reach that point (city of Mexico), or to place it in imminent danger of capture, an army of more than 20,000 men may be needed.”

On the 23d November, it having been determined to send General Scott to the field in chief command, he sketched a project of instructions, which in his judgment

should be given to him by the President. The following is an extract: "The President, respecting your judgment, is pleased with the assurance that, although you think 15,000 land troops not an unreasonable force for the expedition in question, and that 10,000 ought to be considered the minimum number, if it can be obtained in time, you are yet of opinion that the expedition ought to go forward, even with the first 8,000 men that may be embarked off Point Isabel, sooner than incur the danger of losing your men and object by the yellow fever, in consequence of waiting too long for either of the larger numbers that have been mentioned."

Gen. Scott writes to Gen. Taylor, Dec. 20th, 1846, from New Orleans:

"I have supposed that 15,000 land troops, including 5 of regulars, and the coöperation of the blockading squadron, desirable, if not altogether necessary, but am now inclined to move forward to the attack, should I be able to assemble the 5,000 regulars, and say three of volunteers."

Again, he writes to Gen. Taylor from Camargo, January 3d, 1847:

"I believe my arrangements of every sort to be complete, except that every thing depends on my drawing from your command about 5,000 regulars and thousand volunteers."

To the Secretary of War, Gen. Scott writes on the 12th January, from the Brasos, that he hopes to arrive off Vera Cruz by February 10th or 15th, and adds: "I shall attempt the descent, &c., with even half the numbers I should wish to give to any one of my juniors for the same service." * * * * *

"Should success crown our arms on the coast—and I will not anticipate a failure—I beg to repeat that a reinforcement of 10 or 12,000 regulars (new regiments and recruits for the old) will be indispensable (about April) to enable me to make a consecutive advance on the enemy's capital."

Again from off Lobos, February 28th, 1847. "Nevertheless, this army is in *heart*, and crippled as I am in the means required and promised, I shall go forward, and expect to take Vera Cruz and its Castle in time to escape, by pursuing the enemy, the pestilence of the coast."

Again from Jalapa, April 6th, 1847. Referring to the expected levies not arriving, Gen. Scott writes, "I shall nevertheless advance, but whether beyond Puebla, will depend on intervening information and reflection. The general panic given to the enemy at Cerro Gordo still remaining, I think it probable that we shall go to Mexico; or if the enemy recover from that, we must renew the consternation by another blow."

Again from Jalapa, May 20th, 1847. Referring to a second train expected from Vera Cruz. "If it has a second third of the essential supplies—now long waited for—I shall advance, having lost the hope of receiving further reinforcements."

These extracts, taken in connection, show how firmly and how perseveringly he adhered to the plan of the campaign. The two most important facts leading to this conclusion, are his discharge of the volunteers and his movement to Puebla, sundering his connection with home.

Major Ripley on these two points takes essentially the view of Gov. Marcy in his famous reply to Gen. Scott—that reply which elicited so much admiration at the time, for its great ability—but which a careful examination shows to have been, in some respects, "more ostentatious than profound;" and of which one of the distinguishing characteristics is, that it very successfully exposes to the public gaze the infirmities of one of the country's most devoted and most meritorious sons.

The Secretary of War had repeatedly communicated to Gen. Scott the instructions of the President, to be careful of the lives and of the health of the troops—to put

them in healthy positions during the sickly season—to run no risk in occupying unhealthy localities. In May, Gen. Scott learned that the new levies had been diverted to the Rio Grande. The unhealthy season was approaching. Nearly the whole distance from Vera Cruz to Jalapa was exposed to the malaria of the coast. Not doubting that the Secretary would, in his own sphere, conform to the spirit of his own instructions, Gen. Scott presumed that if reinforcements came at all, they would come within the two or three following weeks, that were to be occupied by him at Jalapa, getting up indispensable supplies. At the end of that time, he had every reason to believe that the connection with Vera Cruz would be entirely cut off, and that the army would be left to itself till the close of the sickly season in the fall. Thus the volunteers on the expiration of their term of service in six or seven weeks, would have found themselves in the heart of the enemy's country utterly unable to reach the coast, and to be transported to their homes. The Government was bound in good faith to discharge these men at the expiration of their term of service, and it became evident that this involved their discharge at the very time it occurred—the only time indeed when, according to the information possessed by the General of the health of the country, they could be sent home in safety. Who more needed their services than Gen. Scott? Who was more strongly interested to strain a point, to keep them to the standard of their country? What else could have influenced the General than a sense of what was due these men, and an earnest desire to carry out the instructions of his Government? When Gen. Scott reached Puebla, he found the sick list so enormously large, that to advance upon Mexico, it was deemed necessary to bring to his aid the garrison of Jalapa. His breaking up of that post, shows how much he was in earnest, and that through the most trying circumstances, he kept his eye fixed on the

great object of the campaign. Referring again to the Secretary's repeated instructions in reference to the health of the troops, the General could not have dreamed that the Secretary would make troops run the gauntlet of disease and death from Vera Cruz to come to his aid. On the contrary, he was obliged to presume that there would be no necessity of opening the communications till fall. And the garrison of Jalapa, not needed for this purpose, would be a great, and might be a decisive element in the success of the advance upon Mexico, and he felt obliged not to dispense with its aid. And yet the Secretary in his letter speaks in terms of ridicule and of reprehension of these two measures—measures which were the natural consequence of his own instructions—and which all men would have pronounced eminently wise and fortunate, had the Secretary adhered to his own doctrines. When Secretary Marcy reprehended Gen. Scott for these measures, he in fact reprehended Gen. Scott for not disobeying his own express instructions. He in fact said, "I did tell you to be careful of the health of the troops—but this was all mere talk—and you should have paid no attention to it." Let the appeal be made from the Secretary's letter to the Secretary's instructions. Can the Secretary exclaim, "Thou canst not say I did it?"

When the President committed to General Scott the chief command of all the armies operating in Mexico, and sent him to the field with assurances that he had his entire confidence, he banished every feeling of resentment, and entered upon his duties in the spirit of entire subordination to the wishes and instructions of the government. Under these circumstances, what other construction could he put upon the attempt to supplant him in command by the appointment of a lieutenant-general, than that he had lost the confidence of his government? And must he not have been confirmed in this impression on seeing a gentle-

man sent out in a diplomatic capacity, who was understood to be unfriendly to him, and whose instructions were so loosely framed, that, in connection with his subsequent assumption of high prerogative, General Scott was naturally led to the conclusion that it was the intention to deprive him of a portion of his rights as commander of the army? The President committed two inexcusable blunders, in the lieutenant-general scheme, and in sending out in a diplomatic capacity a gentleman unfriendly to General Scott. Fortunately, Congress did not sanction the first, and the sound sense and exceeding uprightness of character of Mr. Trist rectified the second. The reconciliation between General Scott and Mr. Trist is one of the brightest events in this whole campaign. It was the natural result of two strong, honest, direct minds laboring in singleness of purpose for a common object. We bear testimony to the manliness and thorough disinterestedness of Mr. Trist's course in Mexico. His errors in the outset grew out of the atmosphere of distrust at Washington, from which he had just emerged, but he soon, with the native energy of a strong and independent character, saw and rectified his mistake.

While we thus feel bound to expose the blunders of the administration, and particularly the sophistry of certain portions of Mr. Marcy's celebrated reply to General Scott, we are free to admit that the latter erred greatly in the unmeasured character of his complaints. He erred in attributing to design, what was partly due to ignorance and partly to accident. We have already expressed our opinion of the wise and patriotic services in general of both Mr. Polk and Mr. Marcy. Both General Scott and General Taylor ought not to have overlooked the fact, that the government could have no other interest than their own success. Disaster to our armies in the field, would have been disastrous to the statesmen at the head of the government.

Whilst, therefore, we contend that in view of the instructions of his government, General Scott was bound to discharge the volunteers and break up the garrison of Jalapa, we believe that, disregarding these instructions and exacting of the volunteers the last hour of their terms of service, he had it in his power to push forward to the Mexican capital and to occupy it almost unresisted. We think that, with the immediate prospect of entering the halls of the Montezumas, many of the volunteers might have been induced to re-enlist. The rapid movement of our army must have prevented any rapid organization of the public force of Mexico. The movement would not have been dangerous in the first stage, but it would have been extremely hazardous in the second, when the terms of service of the volunteers had expired and they were being sent to their homes. Had it been the avowed determination of the government entirely to disregard the season, and to push troops forward in spite of disease and death, there could have been no hesitation as to the propriety of the movement. But such was not the policy of the government, and the subsequent delay was the price of a regard to considerations of humanity. With these general observations, we will come at once to the siege of Vera Cruz.

The landing at and reduction of Vera Cruz was effected in March. The most remarkable thing about the siege was the excessive labor of the troops owing to the prevalence of continued and distressing northerners, frequently destroying the works. The batteries were planted with great judgment, and at some eight or nine hundred yards from the city. Trenches connected the batteries with each other and with the lines in rear, insuring throughout the siege safe and easy communications to the troops. The main reliance was on the mortars. A portion of the troops were impatient of the delay, and were anxious to be sent to the assault, without waiting for the effect of the bom-

bardment. The wisdom of the course pursued was soon vindicated, by a proposition of the Mexican commander to surrender on terms; and on the 29th of March our flag was planted on the enemy's works.

Meanwhile news had come of the crowning victory of Angostura, and that General Santa Anna had been sent back headlong upon San Luis Potosi, his army depressed, demoralized, and fearfully reduced in numbers. The sickly season was fast approaching. To gain healthy positions and to anticipate the enemy at the first mountain barrier, it was important to lose no time in sending forward the troops. As fast as means of transportation could be collected, they were put in motion—Twiggs's division in advance. But with that remarkable celerity for which the Mexican armies were distinguished throughout the war, they were found in position at Cerro Gordo, and the battle of that name again vindicated American prowess.

We do not propose to go into a particular examination of this celebrated action, certainly, both in its conception and execution, one of the most remarkable in the Mexican war. An attack was made in front by a brigade of volunteers under the command of General Pillow. But the grand movement was by the flank, against the enemy's left and rear, thus cutting off his retreat and compelling him to lay down his arms. This involved the storming of the Cerro Gordo hill, the key point of his position. The ground had been reconnoitred by the engineers with extreme care. The movements were all known to be perfectly practicable. Before the battle commenced, General Scott verified the dispositions and movements. Twiggs was in chief command of the advanced forces. To Harney was committed the main attack against the hill. To Riley a more advanced movement, flanking Harney's, and looking to the Jalapa road. To Shields a movement still more extended, bringing him to the Jalapa road well to the

rear, and insuring, in conjunction with the other two movements, the success of the general plan.

General Twiggs, early in advance, at a critical moment, ordered up a portion of Riley's command to relieve the pressure upon Harney of the enemy's flankers. In a wonderfully short space of time the Cerro Gordo was seized, and the Jalapa road occupied in force—Santa Anna with great difficulty making his escape on the wheel-mule of his carriage down an almost impracticable mule-path across the river. A portion of the enemy made good their escape, but those within the pass were compelled to lay down their arms. This too, notwithstanding the attack of Pillow had been repulsed, and the commander of the Mexican batteries attacked by him had insisted upon terms.

Pillow was unfortunate in his point of attack. The enemy's strongest point, between batteries 1 and 2, was selected—instead of his weakest point, the right of battery 1, along the river bank, as advised by his engineer officer, Lieutenant, now Brevet-Major Tower. And there was too much precipitation in pushing forward his assaulting columns before they were properly formed, and before his supporting columns were within distance. It had the effect, however, of distracting the attention of Santa Anna, who rode to that portion of the field in the belief that it was the main attack, nor was he disabused of this impression till it was too late to retrieve the field on the left.

Major Ripley's description of the battle is good, with the exception that whilst he praises the deportment of commands and subordinates, he depreciates commanders. General Twiggs is referred to in terms of disparagement, and with great injustice, and General Scott is spoken of as more of an indifferent spectator than an active participant. The order of battle is pronounced impracticable. He gives to it however an exposition which is at total variance with all the initial movements. It was indeed admirably drawn

up, pointing out with great clearness the general movement, and leaving a proper discretion to commanders.

We agree with Major Ripley that the anticipated number of prisoners was not taken, but not in consequence, as he alleges, of the impracticable order of General Scott, but of another fact which he himself furnishes, viz. :—That General Canalizo, surnamed the “lion of Mexico,” instead of bringing up his reserves to the attack, as ordered by Santa Anna, took to precipitate and seasonable flight along the main Jalapa road.

The battle of Cerro Gordo was followed by the occupation, in quick succession, of Jalapa and Perote. Meanwhile, from the strategic position of Orazava, Santa Anna threatened our whole flank from Perote to Vera Cruz. The forward movement to Puebla drew him from that position to the defence of the capital.

The advance to Mexico, steadily contemplated, and early expected, insensibly raised the minds of all men to a most admirable state of self-reliance unmingled with arrogance or vainglory. From the commander to the private in the ranks, it was believed that a great work was to be done, and that, with steadfast hearts and strong arms, it could and would be done.

During the pause at Puebla, General Scott gave especial directions to the engineers to collect information in reference to the several routes to the capital, the obstacles of nature and of art which would obstruct our advance, the troops and the material which would be at the disposal of the enemy. Humboldt and other authorities were consulted, many intelligent persons who had passed over the several routes were examined, and in several instances spies were sent to make special examinations.

From the information thus collected it was known that the city was entirely surrounded either by an inundation or by marshy ground, and was approached by eight causeways flanked with wet ditches, and provided with numer-

ous cuts,—that the whole city was protected by a double, and in some places by a triple line of defensive works, well armed with cannon and defended by some thirty thousand men. The direct approach along the great national road was defended by the strong position of the Peñon, seven miles from the city. Chapultepec stood boldly out on the southwest, and on the north there were known to be formidable works in advance of Guadalupe.

After entering the valley along the national road, there were three general modes of approaching the city: the direct, along the national road; around Lake Tezcuco on the north; around Chalco and Jochimilco on the south.

Early attention had been given to the Chalco route, and to the south and west, as the proper quarter whence to attack the city. The south presented an extended front, with four of the eight causeways of approach nearly parallel to each other, and was necessarily weak. On the west the suburb of San Cosme, a single street lined with houses on either side, extended well into the country, and offered a vulnerable point. Chapultepec, not deemed a very formidable obstacle, required to be swept away, to be free to select the point of attack. Hence Tacubaya, a strong village overawing Chapultepec, became the key point of the whole operation. In the particular operation against the southern front, the occupancy of the church and village of Piedad was of the last importance, in view of all the southern gates, communicating directly with all the villages in rear from Tacubaya to San Augustin, and by a good cross-road, controlling the three causeways of San Antonio, Nino Perdido, and Piedad.

These views occupied the mind of the General in Chief at Puebla, and they naturally grew out of the information collected by the engineers, and which was embodied in a map that, on reaching the valley, was found to be in the main correct, and sufficiently in detail to point out the strategic movements. A copy of this map was sent to each division

commander. It shows a road round Chalco, connecting villages a few miles apart. There was no doubt as to its practicability for our troops and for light trains. But there was doubt as to whether large trains and heavy guns could be taken over it. The lake it was believed, could be used for this latter purpose. Gen. Scott, on leaving Puebla, though impressed with the great advantages of the Chalco route over all others, determined, however, before finally resolving upon his course, to march into the valley, and by reconnaissance, verify the information that had been collected, and to collect all the supplementary information that entered into the determination of the question.

Major Ripley states that about the time of leaving Puebla, Gen. Scott was of opinion that the Chalco route was impracticable, and that his attention was fixed upon the more direct routes. That he was confirmed in his opinion by the result of his reconnaissances after entering the valley, and that in consequence, he fell upon the Mexicalcingo project: and that he was finally induced to revert to the Chalco route in consequence of the advice of Gen. Worth, and the reconnaissance of Col. Duncan. Granting that this route was not practicable for trains, he censures the Mexicalcingo project as in violation of the rules of art and as fraught with danger to the safety of the army.

We think that a fair and full view of the whole subject matter will show that Major Ripley has fallen into great mistakes, both as to his facts and his conclusions. The map itself furnished by Gen. Scott to all the division commanders, would seem to be conclusive as to his information, as to the existence of a road round Chalco, and as to his attention not having been withdrawn from it. But other facts are no less conclusive. The very day of reaching Ayotla, a spy was sent to pass over the road to San Augustin, and the next morning the engineers were sent out with an escort from Twiggs's division to make

an ostentatious reconnaissance before the Peñon, with the special charge to run no risk, as the object was to amuse the enemy. The road, however, to Mexicalcingo, which at Puebla had been reported to be under water, was found to be hard and good for one or two miles, and the Peones in the vicinity were positive that it was equally good for the whole distance. This introduced a new element into the calculations, and Gen. Scott then began to consider whether Tacubaya could not be reached by this direct and more practicable road. Accordingly, he ordered a particular examination of the Mexicalcingo route the next day. The escort of the engineers consisted of a squadron of dragoons and the rifle regiment. Two veteran regiments and a field battery, the whole under the command of Gen. Smith, blocked up the Peñon, and covered the reconnaissance. This protection was ample. No Mexican force could have issued from a narrow causeway with this body in front.

Major Ripley wastes a whole page and a half of criticism on the erroneous supposition that the Peñon was left wholly unguarded, that the whole brigade of Smith had gone to Mexicalcingo, and that Santa Anna could have sallied forth and cut him off before succor could have been brought from the main army.

The goodness of the road was confirmed, though Mexicalcingo was found to be very strongly fortified. The spies, two of whom had been dispatched, reported the road round Chalco to be practicable but rough. Boats and material for rafts were collected to be used on the lakes.

Gen. Scott the same day visited Worth at Chalco, and directed the latter to make additional inquiries as to the character of the road. Duncan suggested to Worth an open reconnaissance, and was by Worth ordered to conduct it.

In his quarters, that evening, the Mexicalcingo project was discussed—which was, simply to block up the Peñon with Pillow's division, and to force Mexicalcingo with the

three remaining divisions—Twiggs and Quitman attacking in front, and Worth (moving rapidly round the lakes with little or no baggage) in flank and rear. A single division not only would keep the enemy, known to be collected in great force, guns and men, in position at the Peñon, but would prevent his issuing therefrom to fall upon our rear. The road to Mexicalcingo was beyond cannon range, so that our troops could not be annoyed in their march. Thus, whilst a very large proportion of the enemy would have been amused by a single division, the three remaining divisions would have been thrown on a single point. Mexicalcingo *forced*, we should have been beforehand with the enemy; and concentrating our force, whilst his own troops and guns were in movement from the Peñon, we could have pierced his extended line, and by one grand blow have ended the campaign.

Mexicalcingo *was* strong. But the road round Chalco was long and difficult. The march must have been slow and toilsome. Delay and accidents might occur in transporting the baggage along the lakes. We should expect that the enemy, rapid in movement and in throwing up defensive works, would meet us on the south and west with the same troops and guns in position that we turned our backs upon at the Peñon, and with works perhaps not less formidable.

In view of all these considerations was the Mexicalcingo project entertained. But it was not deemed safe to send Worth's division round Chalco, unless a communication could be constantly kept up by boats with the bulk of the army operating on the direct route.

The practicability of keeping up this communication was therefore to be determined; which duty was assigned to Capt. Wayne, Quartermaster, and to Lieut. Tower, Engineer.

In the morning, Gen. Scott, anticipating a favorable result as regarded this examination, gave some initial orders looking to the Mexicalcingo route. But towards night, learn-

ing from Capt. Wayne and Lieut. Tower that nothing whatever could be done with the lakes, and from Col. Duncan that the road round the lakes was excellent, he reverted to his original intention of moving the whole army round Chalco.

The utter impracticability of using the lakes as a means of communication, led of necessity to the abandonment of the attack on Mexicalcingo. A direct attack only was never for a moment contemplated, and it was impossible to concert a combined attack against the front and in flank and rear.

The reconnaissance of Col. Duncan removed all doubts as to the entire practicability of the Chalco route for our immense trains and our heavy guns. This reconnaissance, under existing circumstances, was absolutely necessary. If it had not been made by Duncan on the 14th, it must have been made by some other officer on the 15th. Worth and Duncan are entitled to the credit of having from the first seen the importance of the route. They took the initiative in making an open examination of it, and thereby probably saved one day in the movement. But the promptitude and decision of Gen. Scott in resolving upon his course as soon as this supplementary information came in, is conclusive as to his grasp of the whole field, and, in connection with facts already recapitulated, is equally conclusive as to the Chalco route equally with the other routes having ever been kept in mind.

The friends of Worth and Duncan expose the services of these officers to depreciation in claiming for them the whole credit of the movement round Chalco. They did a positive service in accelerating a movement, the success of which depended so much upon time. But we think a careful inquiry into the facts will show that the Chalco route would and must have been pursued, even though they both had opposed it. It was a fixed fact which had im-

pressed itself upon many officers of that army. We say this in simple justice to all the participants in that movement, and with no intention to disparage Worth or Duncan. Their names have now become historical, and should be cherished by their companions in arms.

To Worth we shall hereafter allude. Duncan, stricken down in the midst of a still opening manhood, was, in many respects, altogether the ablest of our younger officers. He showed throughout the war abilities of the highest order, and on both lines his services were conspicuous. On the battle-field, wonderfully quick, cool, and resolute—piercing with a glance through the plans of the enemy, and discovering the strong and weak points of the field; and in council patient, deliberative, and full of forecast. His fame is dear to us, and it is not for us to pluck a single laurel from his brow.

The march round Chalco was therefore resolved upon, and it was made. Worth, in advance, seized San Augustin on the 17th, the rear under Twiggs not getting up till the morning of the 19th. Gen. Scott, on reaching the advance on the morning of the 18th, summoned his engineer officers, and observing, "to-day the enemy may feel us, to-morrow we must feel him," ordered prompt and careful reconnaissances of the different routes to the capital.

The San Antonio causeway led due north from San Augustin twelve miles to the city. A mule-path running nearly west led to the nearly parallel and equally good road of San Angel. The reconnoitring officers were divided, and proceeded in these two directions.

With Worth's division as a support, and Thornton's dragoons as an escort, the engineers proceeded on the San Antonio causeway, and found the enemy in force in the strongly fortified position of San Antonio. Worth's division seized the Hacienda Capua in front of San Antonio, and the reconnaissance was pushed to the right and left.

The right was found impracticable, and the left extremely difficult, in consequence of the Pedregal. The reconnaissance towards the San Angel road verified the information collected in Puebla, that, by a little work, the mule-path leading thereto could be made practicable for wagons. A division of the enemy was, however, found in full force opposite the egress of this path.

Two plans were discussed at the quarters of the General in Chief the same evening—one to force San Antonio, the other to mask San Antonio, and gain the San Angel road. The forcing of San Antonio would be done in near presence of the main Mexican army, and might lead to a general contest in his strongly fortified line of works. The gaining the San Angel road involved at the most encountering a single division of the enemy, at a distance from his main body, and could not but lead the army to the desired strategic position of Tacubaya with little loss. But the policy of the enemy being to fight behind his works, the office of this division was that of observation, and it was to be expected that, as soon as our movement was developed, it would retire upon the main body. The forcing of San Antonio would certainly involve a sharp conflict, and might lead to a general action. The crossing to the San Angel road would not probably be seriously opposed by the enemy. If a fight did ensue, it would be outside his works, under the most advantageous circumstances for us, and the most disadvantageous for him, and it was the very thing to be desired.

The movement upon San Angel was decided upon, and Worth was kept in front of San Antonio to mask it. Quitman's division was ordered to hold San Augustin, now become the key of operations.

On the morning of the 19th, Pillow's division was sent forward to make the mule-path practicable for the trains, and Twiggs, on coming up from the rear, was ordered to

the front to cover it and brush away the enemy. In case the action became general, Pillow was to assume the command until the General in Chief came upon the field.

Accordingly Pillow's division worked the road. Twiggs pushed his division past Pillow's, who placed at his disposal his own batteries, and immediately began his part of brushing away the enemy. All the engineers and topographical engineers of the general staff, save three, were at that time serving with Twiggs and actively engaged in reconnoitring.

The result was, that Twiggs was advised to make the main attack against the enemy's left, to cut him off from his reinforcements from the city, and to hurl him into the gorges of the mountains. To cover this movement, he was advised to make a bold demonstration in front, and to employ Callender's howitzer battery in driving the enemy's skirmishers in great force from the Pedregal. The demonstration, to be effective, must be sharp, fierce, bold, like a real attack, and Magruder's battery was pushed forward to give countenance to it. Accordingly, Twiggs dispatched Riley against the left and Smith to the front.

The front attack was made with exceeding vigor and effect; it held firmly the attention of the enemy, and enabled Riley to seize the village of Ansaldo.

But though Pillow gave independently to Riley the order which had been received from Twiggs, he allowed more than an hour to elapse before doing any thing to support either the front or flank attack. This unfortunate delay gave time for the enemy's reinforcements to come up, and prevented carrying into effect on that day the original suggestions of the staff-officers of the General in Chief.

Riley moved about half past one o'clock, Cadwallader not till nearly three. Riley moved to the rear of, and reconnoitred the enemy's camp, with two successful encounters with the enemy's lancers. Cadwallader was obliged

to halt at the village to keep the immense reinforcements of the enemy in check.

Though Cadwalader moved too late to attack the rear of the enemy's camp in concert with Riley, he moved in time to prevent the junction of the enemy with the command of Valencia.

Simultaneously with the movement of Cadwalader two regiments of Pierce, at the request of Twiggs, were ordered to the front. They advanced with great spirit, and under the guidance of the engineer-officers seized the ravine within four hundred yards of the camp.

The bold demonstration in front, and particularly the daring and prompt movement of Pierce, distracting the attention of the enemy, was Riley's safety in his isolated position encountering the lancers, it being remembered that Cadwalader was still struggling through the Pedregal.

Morgan's regiment, which had been detached as a reserve, was not sent to reinforce Cadwalader, though the reinforcements of the enemy were now seen coming from the city, till Cadwalader had been a whole hour in movement.

About this time also, the demonstration in front having done its work, Smith moved also to the village.

On reaching the village General Smith assumed command, and resolved to attack the reserves of the enemy. But after making all his arrangements, he was obliged to abandon the attempt in consequence of the approach of night.

General Scott came upon the ground about four o'clock, and on the arrival of Shields an hour and a half later, he immediately dispatched him to the same point.

At nightfall therefore the enemy was intact in his intrenched camp. The San Angel road was seized, and two strong villages occupied, cutting Valencia off from succor. Two regiments of Pierce, the batteries and a few rifles,

were in front. The troops had worked and suffered prodigiously, and nothing apparently had been done. Cheer upon cheer came from the enemy's lines. The rain began to fall, and in their dreary bivouac, our brave troops looked forward with anxiety to the day.

General Smith resolved to attack the intrenched camp at three in the morning. He sent Captain Lee to the General in Chief to communicate his plans, and if they met his approbation, to arrange an attack in front. But with the true spirit of a soldier, he declared his determination to prosecute his attack in case the difficulties of the way prevented his getting a response from the General in Chief.

It was a memorable evening, that of the 19th of August, in the quarters of General Scott. Many officers of his general, as well as personal staff, were present. There was some despondency on the part of those who simply looked to the fact that after a day of incessant labor and great exposure, the enemy had not been seriously touched. But the confidence of all was restored by the great coolness and steadiness of the General in Chief. As his officers came in from the field, wet and hungry, he made them sit at his table and break their fast. He neglected none of the courtesies due to guests. His bearing was most noble. It exalted the spirits of all present.

About eleven o'clock, Capt. Lee came in from beyond the Pedregal, stated the aspect of the field, and submitted the plan of General Smith. From other officers was ascertained the position of each regiment in front. At this juncture Generals Pillow and Twiggs came in. They had struggled for several hours in the Pedregal, after nightfall, in the endeavor to reach their commands, and had been obliged to abandon the attempt.

General Scott made known to them the position of their respective commands and the whole state of the field. He expressed his entire approbation of the plan of General

Smith, and his determination to support it by an attack or demonstration in front. Not a suggestion had either of these, the two division commanders of the force in that village of San Geronimo, to make, in reference to the contemplated plan of attack.

About midnight Capt. Lee was ordered back to the field, with the orders of General Scott to collect and form a temporary brigade under Ransom, of the two regiments of Pillow's division on this side of the Pedregal, and some scattered troops of other commands, to support General Smith's attack. General Twiggs, though a heavy man, advanced in years, and much injured by a fall in the Pedregal, peremptorily declined General Scott's invitation to take lodgings in his quarters, and returned to the field. General Pillow was ordered to remain.

Contreras is embalmed in history, and we need not repeat the glorious story. The veteran division of Valencia was broken into pieces, and our army resumed its movement upon the capital.

Thus pursuing the San Angel route to Tacubaya, the enemy, in his folly, had offered his flank to our blow, and now in return we were pressing on his centre, and on his rear. Every man in that glorious army saw before him a beaten and dispirited enemy, who must be pursued to his final overthrow. All eyes saw before them that splendid city, all hearts felt that the decisive moment had come. The toils of the morning, the sleepless bivouac, the incessant labors of the Pedregal were forgotten. Shields, Twiggs, Pillow, successively in command, pushed forward the troops on the heels of the retreating enemy. One terrific blow, and peace would be restored to that unequalled valley, and the high mission of that band of heroes would be accomplished.

General Scott, at early dawn, had ordered a brigade of Worth to proceed in the direction of Contreras, to guard

against the possibility of disaster, and proceeded himself to the field. As soon as information of the victory was received, the brigade was ordered back, and the General in Chief, on reaching the intrenched camp, at once resolved upon his plans. They were in perfect accordance with the state of affairs so entirely unexpected, on initiating the movement of the previous day. Not Tacubaya was to be reached, but the enemy himself was to be struck.

General Scott sent word to General Worth that he should attack the rear of San Antonio with the victorious troops now pushing forward from the battle-field of Contre-ras. Worth was ordered to display his division in front of San Antonio—to be on the alert, and on hearing the report of arms to fall upon the enemy in front.

In reply to a message from General Pillow suggesting the same movement, General Scott ordered him to move on cautiously; and he soon after followed himself. He reached the army some fifteen minutes after it was halted by his orders at Coyacan, and was received with the most enthusiastic cheering.

He immediately directed one engineer officer, with Kearney's troop of dragoons and the rifle regiment as an escort, to reconnoitre the rear of San Antonio, and another to observe the field from the steeple of the church. In some ten minutes the latter officer reported that the enemy were abandoning San Antonio, and that the road for a mile was occupied by his troops and baggage in retreat.

Immediately General Twiggs was ordered, by a cross road running to the east, to fall upon the retreating enemy with Smith's brigade. Pillow, with a single brigade (Cadwalader's), was sent on a road to the southeast, to co-operate with the advance of Worth. The brigades of Riley, Pierce, and Shields, were held in reserve, to await the development of the field.

Twiggs pushed forward Smith's brigade, and halted its

head at a fork of the road. Two of the engineer officers, on duty with him, rode rapidly forward on these two roads, which were found to lead respectively to and in front of a strong stone building that was filled with the enemy's troops. At the junction of the north road with the San Antonio causeway, some 500 yards distant, the troops of the enemy were seen in full retreat. Without delay the engineer company was brought up to the front of the convent to push the reconnaissance. A prisoner was taken, who declared that the enemy had only two guns in position. The position itself was shrouded with trees and chapparel, so that only the upper portion of the works could be seen.

Whilst Twiggs was interrogating the prisoner a firing was heard on the right. It was believed by some to be the rifles, and by others, the engineer company prosecuting its reconnaissance of the enemy's position. Immediately Twiggs determined to attack the convent and carry it by a "coup de main," thus succoring our own troops, supposed to be engaged in reconnaissance, and striking the retreating enemy on the San Antonio causeway. The position was believed to have been taken for the moment, to cover this very retreat. To enable the stormers to advance, he ordered Taylor's battery to be planted in front of the convent, to drive its defenders from the roof and windows by grape.

Thus, in the vigorous pursuit of a defeated and retreating enemy, was the advance brigade of the veteran division of Twiggs brought up against the key-point of the enemy's position; and the terrible conflict of Churubusco was commenced.

It must be remembered that Twiggs, at the head of his division at the fork of the roads, was only 400 yards from the walls of the convent, on the direct road, and 300 yards from the position afterwards occupied by Taylor's battery, and that he became hotly engaged with the enemy in thirty

minutes from the first commencement of the reconnaissance.

The return fire of the enemy admonished both the division commander and the General in Chief of the true state of the field. Immediately the latter ordered Pierce to advance with his brigade, by a road running nearly due north, and, making a detour, to fall upon the rear of the enemy; and Shields soon after was sent in the same direction, with orders to assume command of the temporary division, and execute the orders originally given to Pierce. Riley's brigade was sent to the support of Twiggs, and was by him ordered to attack the right and rear of the convent.

But the firing which led to the prompt advance of Twiggs was really the shock of Worth's advance, a portion of the gallant 6th infantry, and a few men of the 5th (not more than 150 men), upon the Tête de Pont, a strong field-work covering the bridge of Churubusco on the San Antonio causeway, and a little retired behind the convent. Entirely unsupported, these brave men were obliged to seek cover, and await the coming up of the division.

Worth's division was still well in rear. Before he received his orders from General Scott to co-operate in the attack in the rear of San Antonio, he had put Clarke's brigade in motion. Clarke pursuing the route reconnoitered on the two previous days, passed his command over the Pedregal to the right of the enemy. So difficult was the way, that only about one hundred men had emerged from the rocks, and approached the main road to the capital, as the enemy's retreating column, three thousand strong, was filing by. But under the advice and guidance of Capt. Mason, of the engineers, this small body charged the enemy's column, and cut it in two. The brigade coming up, one-half of the enemy's force was so closely pursued by the 6th infantry, and one company of the 5th, that though the latter were unable to continue their advance,

and were obliged to fall back from the terrible fire of the bridge head of Cherubusco, the former passed directly through and took no further part in the battle. The other half of the enemy's force was pushed back towards San Antonio, and across the fields, by the bulk of Clarke's brigade, which, continuing its course, met Garland's brigade, put in motion one hour after the movement of Clarke, at no great distance in advance of the abandoned works.

Clarke now countermarched, and, uniting his brigade with that of Garland, the division pushed forward on the causeway, and after gaining the position from which the gallant charge of Hoffman had been made more than an hour earlier, and whither he had withdrawn his command, was formed under the personal direction of Gen. Worth, and a portion against the front of the Tête de Pont, the remainder against its left flank, some along the causeway, and others in the corn-fields on the right, it was sent against the enemy's position.

At this juncture, one sheet of flame proceeded from the enemy's extended line, and amid that terrific din of battle, bold assailants and bold defenders contested every foot of ground. Taylor's splendid battery nobly did its work, enabling Smith's stormers to gain a near position to the front of the convent. Riley had already opened his fire on its right. Worth's troops, now driven back, now gallantly advancing, finding certain death in one direction, and changing their course only to meet it in another, still with stout hearts, slowly gaining ground, inch by inch, sustained nobly the battle on the right.

But the great strategic movement of the field was now well in progress, and the battle was near its termination. Shields, in command of his own and Pierce's brigade, had steadily pursued his way, and crossing the river of Churubusco directed his command upon the San Antonio road. As he approached, the enemy detached from his main line,

extending a new line of battle along the causeway, in the direction of the city. Shields moved more and more to the left, and the enemy extended his line in the same direction, more and more reducing his force in front.

First, the regiments of Pierce, and then those of Shields, came under the fire of the enemy. It is not a subject of reproach to these troops, all new, and those of Pierce just from home, that under the most dreadful fire of the battle they fell into confusion, and, gaining the shelter of some buildings, were with some difficulty re-formed. Their officers made the most extraordinary exertions. Shields was conspicuous for his gallant bearing and his great personal exposure. The emergency required it. The only safety to his command, perhaps to the army itself, was to reach the causeway. Nobly did the gallant Palmettos sustain the honor of their State. Their colonel shot dead, their lieutenant-colonel wounded, four color-bearers successively shot down, and nearly one half their officers disabled, they, in conjunction with the New York regiment, were led on by Shields to the road, and the enemy's line was cut.

About the same moment, the enemy's left flank, including the Tête de Pont, yielded to Worth's onset, and he in conjunction with Pillow, whose troops (Cadwalader's brigade) had come up in season to be exposed to the fire, but not to take a decisive part in the operations, passed on towards the city.

The convent, whose fire, half an hour previous to the success of Worth and Shields, had been nearly silenced, still held out. But attacked in front and right flank by Twiggs, all retreat cut off by Worth and Shields occupying the Tête de Pont and causeway in the rear, Duncan opening two guns on one of the long faces of the work, and Larkin Smith directing a 4-lb against the convent, the white flag was hung out at the very moment that the 2d and 3d infantry carried the work at the point of the bayonet.

Immediately the flag of the 3d infantry was planted on the roof of the building, and over one thousand prisoners, including three general officers, surrendered to Twiggs.

Thus, by the prompt and masterly arrangements of the General in Chief, and the gallant conduct of commanders and of troops, was the terrible and decisive victory of Churubusco achieved. It was won by a combined movement of all the divisions. All suffered in nearly equal proportion, and to no particular one belongs the glory.

The gallant charge of Hoffman led to the prompt attack of Twiggs. It was the stern, steady attitude of Twiggs, and in particular the admirable serving of Taylor's battery, that paved the way for Worth's subsequent advance. Twiggs and Worth hotly engaged, it was the soldierly and admirable advance of Shields, that led to the weakening of the enemy's force in front. And it was Shields' final charge and Twiggs' unflinching attack, that led to the abandonment of the Tête de Pont to the vehement assault of Worth. The convent, the key of the position, was of course the last to hold out.

Worth deserves great credit for his movements about San Antonio, not in consequence of its abandonment by the enemy, which resulted as a matter of course, from the advance of the main army to its rear, but for passing Clarke over the Pedregal, cutting the whole retreating force of the enemy in two, and preventing their taking any part in the subsequent battle. Worth was opposed to the Contreras movement as determined upon by Gen. Scott on the evening of the 18th, and was in favor of forcing San Antonio by the movements which he carried into effect on the 20th. Being advised by Gen. Scott of the movement of the main army, and knowing as a commander what its effect must be upon the garrison of San Antonio, he exercised a sound discretion in anticipating and modifying the order to attack in front when he heard a firing in rear.

Shields especially commands our admiration, by his unflinching resolution and gallant bearing in presence of the overwhelming force of the enemy. Although his troops faltered and broke, so terrible was the fire, and so great their loss, he succeeded in rallying and forming them, and gloriously won that portion of the field. This gallant and modest officer, on reaching the village of Ansaldo, the evening before, after Smith had matured his plans to assault the heights, with a rare magnanimity declined all interference and direction, and contented himself with holding that key-point against the reserves of the enemy. But in the terrible agony of Churubusco, his was no secondary part, and we hesitate not to pronounce him second to no division commander on that field.

We will now notice certain criticisms of Major Ripley in relation to general dispositions and movements.

1. He censures the course of General Scott, in working the road before fighting the battle of Contreras. The battle should have been fought, and the road worked afterwards. To which we reply as follows: The enemy's force was known to consist of 30,000 men. There were 24,000 in his main lines, and only 6,000 in this camp. Their presence could have no other object than to observe our movements. Had we marched our two divisions against them, they would have retired, and the divisions would have marched back to work the road.

If, however, contrary to their whole military system, the enemy had determined to make the grand struggle on that field, it was important that we should be able to bring to bear our whole disposable force, and have our artillery at command. This involved working the road. General Scott foresaw and provided for both alternatives.

Again, Maj. Ripley censures the dispositions of General Scott, on the ground that they contemplated the battle being commenced by one General, continued by a second, and ter-

minated by a third. To which we reply, that the observation will apply with equal force to many of the most celebrated battles of Napoleon, particularly to Rivoli, where Napoleon did not come upon the ground till the battle was well commenced. And we presume, neither Maj. Ripley, nor any other well-informed military person, will contest the fact, that the maxims of Napoleon are to be illustrated by his campaigns. But the criticism of our author, though ingenious, is unsound. The orders of General Scott provided for one direction. He placed at the head of the column his own staff-officers—men who knew his plans, and upon whose advice not only division commanders could rely, but were expected to rely with confidence. General Pillow was ordered to take command in case the action became general, that is, if the affair was any thing more than an affair of pickets, which we had all along the road during our marches in the valley, with the advisement, that the General himself would promptly come on the field. We really cannot see what other course Gen. Scott could have pursued. If the criticism means any thing, it means this: that Gen. Scott should have been in the very advance, to direct the attack of our skirmishers upon the enemy, or to resist their attack upon us; that is, he should have been both in front of Twiggs at Contreras, and in front of Worth at San Antonio. For how could Gen. Scott have foreseen that the 6,000 men of Valencia, arrayed on the height of Contreras, was not a feint, and that as soon as Twiggs and Pillow were well drawn out from San Augustin, the remaining 24,000 men of the enemy, would not have been hurled against Worth, and the main battle have been fought in defence of San Augustin, the key of all our operations? Now, it is remarkable, that General Scott, in assigning to Quitman the command of this *dépôt*, enlarged upon this very consideration; and it shows how comprehensive was his grasp of the whole field of opera-

tions. It was necessary for the safety of the army, that Gen. Scott should remain in San Augustin till the enemy had shown his hand; then was the time for him to repair to the field, which he did.

Again, Major Ripley contends, that though Gen. Scott committed the military error of providing three successive commanders for that field, yet that by good fortune all the movements were under the supervision of one person, and he was Gen. Pillow. The facts are these: Twiggs' own division went into action by Twiggs' special order, and under his immediate supervision. Pillow placed his own batteries at Twiggs' disposal; and with some general remarks about opening the battle, refrained from all interference. The first dispositions were made by Twiggs, under the advisement of the staff officers of the General in Chief. The course to be pursued was manifest. The young lieutenants even saying to Twiggs before a battery had been pushed to the front: "The main attack should be against the enemy's left. Attack his left—you cut him off from his reserves, and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains." Pillow gave to Riley the same order which had previously been given by Twiggs, though without concert between them, and afterwards made a disposition of his own force similar to that of Twiggs. Pillow undoubtedly saw the necessity of the movements. He had the counsel of several highly intelligent staff officers, one being the author of the work under review.

Inasmuch as he adopted General Twiggs' dispositions, conforming his own thereto, it may be said that the earlier movements of the day were made under his supervision, but not the subsequent movements. We will, however, respectfully ask, why was Pillow's course so vacillating and uncertain? Why did he send an order to Riley, still struggling through the Pedregal, to return? Why did he delay the march of Cadwalader and of Morgan? Why did he

send all three on an uncertain errand, without even indicating what they should do? We answer, because he was wanting in the clear conception and prompt decision required by the emergency, which is the gist of the whole matter. The known fact, that when the whole force was collected in that village no allusion was made to his orders, is very significant.

In simple justice to Twiggs, he showed on that field, as well as on the field of Churubusco, great steadiness, resolution, and intrepidity. We regret that Major Ripley has indulged in sneers at his conduct and soldiership. There are too many witnesses to his cool and gallant bearing to permit this to pass without rebuke.

It has not been the fortune of courts of inquiry to become historical. Nor will a better fate await their commentators. The historian, in narrating the events of the second conquest of Mexico, will appeal to all the actors in that great drama. That entire army will be his witnesses, the world and latest posterity his judges. The court of inquiry upon which Major Ripley draws so largely, did not have before them the management of that army, but simply the part played by one of the subordinates. General Pillow was at its bar to exculpate himself from weighty charges, and yet the court, with but a fraction of the immense mass of testimony to guide their decisions, and under circumstances making it their duty to give to the General the benefit of all doubts, came to the conclusion that he had arrogated to himself too much credit for that field. Had Twiggs likewise been on his trial, and had all the officers serving with him been examined, the whole aspect of the case would have been changed.

We consider the author's description of the battle of Churubusco as graphic and true. He fails in his observations on the general movements.

One of the most extraordinary views presented is this.

That General Scott should not have fought the battle at all, but adhering essentially to his original plan, he first should have carefully reconnoitered the ground to the left of the position of Churubusco, and after bringing forward his trains from San Augustin, and establishing his dépôts, he should have advanced on the Ninon Perdido road and compelled the enemy to fight in the open field. This observation is predicated on the fact that the Ninon Perdido road was totally unfortified when the battle of Churubusco was fought. To which we reply: That a General who either by a blind adherence to an original purpose, or by too much care in selecting the most favorable point of attack, shall neglect to avail himself of the unforeseen chances of the contest, and particularly shall fail to strike his enemy when in full retreat and before he can have time to embody his troops, and especially when that enemy is demoralized by a disaster and his own troops are raised to the highest pitch of confidence and exaltation, is surely destined to be overthrown. This groping for a field of battle was the vice of that continental system, which led to Napoleon's extraordinary successes. General Scott would have criminally endangered the safety of his army and would have sadly depreciated his own reputation, had he hesitated for a moment.

What are the great facts of the battle of Churubusco? They are these: General Scott launched his whole force against a point of the enemy's extended line, and with such vigor and resolution, that a very large proportion of the enemy's force never reached the field of battle. Our losses to be sure were great. But this was unavoidable in so unequal a contest. Fortune favored us, and we had a chief who knew how to avail himself of her smiles.

But we totally deny the alternative of our author. The establishing of our dépôts and the selecting of a new point of attack would have occupied the whole of the 20th, and

probably a portion of the 21st. The enemy would have seen our hand, would have embodied all his force, and have completed his inner line of defensive works. Instead of fighting in the open field where our field batteries could have been brought into play, we should have fought him behind his works in close proximity to the city, with his whole army embodied and confirmed in heart by the twenty-four to forty-eight hours' delay.

There would have been no opportunity for a great strategic movement like that of Shields, essentially a *field* movement. We no doubt should have conquered ; but it would have been a prolonged struggle for many days, not one terrible onset of three hours, as really occurred.

General Scott had but these two alternatives : to strike at once and with unflinching resolution, a retreating and demoralized enemy, at a distance from the city and essentially in the open field ; or to delay to strike and select a new point of attack, allowing the ardor of our troops to subside, insuring no increase of force, showing our hand to the enemy, giving him time to complete his interior line of defenses and to embody his whole force in firm array, to recover in fact from the discouragement of defeat. Who can doubt that General Scott showed the qualities of a great commander by his course ?

But it is made a matter of accusation against General Scott, that he left his commanders without orders, and that the credit of the first general disposition of the troops belongs to fortune, and to no general officer whatever. To which we reply, that when General Scott gave his orders at Co-yacan, directing two brigades on two roads to strike the San Antonio causeway at two different points, the enemy were seen in full retreat on that causeway, towards the city. As soon as the fire of the enemy opened, developing better his position, the three remaining brigades were immediately pushed to the front and flank. This prompt movement

against the enemy on the San Antonio road was in fact substantially an order to General Worth, to press the enemy on that road. It was so understood, and must have been so understood by Worth. Pillow was sent to the rear of San Antonio. Why so? Was San Antonio his object, or the enemy, supposed to be near San Antonio? The enemy; and hence Pillow's change of direction. We are rather of opinion that had General Pillow pursued a fruitless errand towards San Antonio, and had General Worth failed to move upon the road, there would have been some emphatic orders from the General in Chief.

The movements of Pillow and Worth, the change of direction of the former, and the embodying and pushing forward the division of the latter, after cutting the column of the enemy retreating from San Antonio, resulted as a matter of course from the fact that we were now seeking the enemy and nothing else. A great fact of which the humblest soldier in that army was cognizant. Such movements belong to the responsibilities and discretion of division commanders, and in the present case, could not have been mistaken by the most ordinary capacity.

General Scott throughout this campaign maintained his character of Commander in Chief, and never committed the folly of playing the part of a subordinate.

We now quote, as having great significance in this connection, the following from Marshal Saxe. "Many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of warfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two rival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of columns. They have considered it sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to send orders in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one quarter to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctu-

ations of the day, or calmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. They endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing."

We respectfully inquire what orders did Gen. Scott forbear to give, which ought to have been given? What orders did he give, which ought to have been forborne? Military critics will find these questions hard to answer.

The difficulty with Major Ripley's military criticisms is, that he does not discriminate between the sphere of the General in Chief and the spheres of division commanders. Whilst Gen. Scott was responsible for the general direction of the divisions, the particular management of the divisions, the particular mode in which the advance of these divisions became engaged with the enemy, were matters of detail for which division commanders were responsible.

Worth on the San Antonio causeway, Pillow in support, Twiggs on the cross-road, Shields to the rear—all had for their object the enemy—the enemy were to be attacked—a battle was to be fought—the war was to be ended. So much for Gen. Scott. In the execution of these movements each became engaged in a particular way, and the merit or the censure must inure to each accordingly.

Objection is made that the country was not known; to which we reply, that it was known sufficiently for the purpose of engaging the battle. The battle had to be entered into to get further knowledge. The prompt attack of Twiggs developed the whole front of the enemy, and enabled the General in Chief to make those final dispositions which achieved the victory.

We do not mean to say that a vastly better hypothetical order of battle could not have been devised. But such a mode of treating the subject we consider puerile. The question is simply this, with all the facts which the General in Chief had in his possession, it being admitted that much was unknown, was he justified in fighting the battle, and

would these facts have enabled him to make a better distribution of his forces ?

War itself is an operation where at all times much is necessarily unknown. The great quality of a commander is, seizing essential crowning facts, so to arrange his plans, as not to be disturbed by that *terra incognita*, which no military prescience can unveil.

We unhesitatingly refer to the battle of Churubusco as affording incontestable proof of the great energy and capacity of Gen. Scott on the field of battle.

The consequence of this decisive conflict, demoralizing and fearfully reducing the public force of Mexico, was that an armistice was entered into for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace. At the moment of concluding this armistice, Gen. Scott had in his possession ample proofs of the small military force which the enemy had at his disposal, and few persons doubted that a treaty of peace would be finally concluded upon. In consequence of this conviction, shared by the General in Chief and the body of the army, the former determined to impose no condition which would in any respect throw obstacles in the way of negotiation, or unnecessarily humble Mexican pride. And in this spirit he receded from his first demand, that Chapultepec should be surrendered.

This armistice is the subject of severe animadversion on the part of our author, and Gen. Scott is held up as endangering the safety and sacrificing the lives of his gallant troops, for the selfish object of winning popular favor and reaching the grand object of his life—the Presidency.

We deem this a most unjust and illiberal view of the whole transaction. It requires but a very cursory examination of the page of history to learn, that almost all the treaties of peace, resulting from the issue of arms, have first been preceded by an armistice, and this armistice has not unfrequently been proposed by the victorious party.

An armistice, is at least a most desirable preliminary to a treaty of peace, though not absolutely essential. And yet, our author contends, that the Government, in sending out Mr. Trist, never intended there should be a suspension of hostilities until a treaty was actually signed. It will not be denied, that our government and people were exceedingly anxious to bring difficulties to a close. Every one was looking to the campaign of Scott to conquer a peace. This expression was in every body's mouth. Peace was the great object desired by all, and more grateful to all than the most splendid achievements of arms. Is not this fact the simple, obvious explication of Gen. Scott's whole course? Was it not his plain and obvious duty, to let no opportunity slip that should promise to secure the accomplishment of this object? Personally, had he not more to gain by his triumphal entry into the magnificent city of the Aztecs, than by forbearing to enter for the sake of a peace, the negotiating of which was to redound to the honor of another?

The course pursued by General Scott in entering into the Tacubaya armistice, will form one of the brightest pages of the history of our country. Through all time it can be referred to, as convincing proof of the moderation, of the sincerity, and of the magnanimity of the government he represented. And when we consider the fact, that Commissioners on both sides *did* meet, and that the negotiations at one time, were all but successful; that Santa Anna himself had almost determined to sign the treaty, and that he deliberated long before he concluded to make a second appeal to arms, we consider General Scott to be entirely vindicated in his course.

We speak thus in general terms of the armistice. In reference to details, we think a mistake was made in not insisting upon the surrender of Chapultepec. But we do not consider this serious cause of censure, when we reflect, how utterly prostrate in the dust was the enemy, and how

strong in himself and his gallant troops, was the victorious General. Major Ripley sneers at this magnanimity of Gen. Scott: we, however, thank God for its exhibition, and we have only to hope, that in our future wars, our armies shall have the guidance of a chief of equal skill and valor in the shock of battle, and of equal magnanimity to a conquered foe.

The armistice proved of no avail. The conflict was renewed, and in nine short days, Santa Anna and his army were driven fugitives from that valley, which all the wiles of policy, and all the resources of the state could not save from the iron grasp of his terrible antagonist.

The armistice was brought to an end at twelve o'clock, M., September 7th. During the morning of that day, the Mexican troops were seen marching out from the city, and taking a position in the vicinity of Molino del Rey. General Scott had received information that the enemy had a boring apparatus at this place, and were at the time actively engaged in casting cannon. He determined to seize the foundry by a night attack, and to cut off this source of supply. Gen. Worth was intrusted with the management of the enterprise, and Cadwalader's brigade reinforced his own command. The attack, made at dawn of day, was the most dreadful shock of arms of the whole war, and was finally won at all points by our gallant troops, after experiencing a greater proportionate loss than that of the English at the assault of Badajoz. The foundry was found, however, to have no apparatus for boring cannon, and our troops were withdrawn from the position.

We cannot but highly praise Maj. Ripley's description of this brilliant achievement, and we agree with most that he has to say in commemoration of the skill of commanders, and the devotion of officers and of men. The surprise is, that after such a loss, and against such odds, the field was won at all; and it exemplifies the hardihood, the patriot-

ism, and the self-sacrifice of American troops. We moreover find his criticisms more just and discriminating, than many that have before come under our notice, and we concur with much that he has to say in animadversion of the measures of the General in Chief. We think with him, that Gen. Scott committed a mistake in directing a partial attack, for the mere purpose of destroying a foundry. We think the object was not of sufficient consequence, to have entered for a moment into his plans. The battle of Molino should have been fought on the morning of the 8th of September, not by three brigades simply, but by six brigades under the command of the General in Chief. Chapultepec, the pride, and the hope of the enemy, should have been seized. When on the morning of the seventh, Gen. Scott saw the enemy place himself without his city, and in striking distance of his force, he should have hailed it as a favor of fortune, and should have profited by it in the same masterly manner, as he did by the folly of Valencia, in stupidly maintaining his position in his intrenched camp at Contreras. On the 6th, when he gave notice to Santa Anna, that the armistice would be terminated at 12 M. on the 7th, he should at the same moment have ordered Twiggs and Quitman, at San Angel and San Augustin, to be ready to move to new positions on its expiration. When on the morning of the next day, the movement of the enemy was developed, these Generals should have been ordered to concentrate their troops at Mixcoac, and Pillow should have been advanced to Piedad.

This disposition rendering it uncertain whether Scott would attack Molino, or the southern front, would doubtless have led to some detachments from the Mexican force to guard other avenues, and thus bringing up the divisions of Twiggs and Quitman at early dawn, the bulk of our army could have been directed with resistless force, and Chapultepec must have fallen almost without resistance. We hesi-

tate not to say that in one short hour the battle would have been fought and won. It was the most splendid opportunity of the war. Not one division, but the bulk of Santa Anna's army had offered itself to our blow.

It is said that General Scott did not contemplate a battle. To which we reply: it was utterly impossible to seize the foundry, without driving the enemy from his entire position—in other words, without fighting the battle. Let the friends of General Scott frankly admit that he committed a mistake. The vindication of General Scott at Molino is to be found in his splendid conduct at Chapultepec. Thus was it with Napoleon at Marengo. Thus, alas, was it not with Napoleon at Ligny, and at Waterloo.

But General Worth's dispositions were faulty; the attack should either have been made at night, as originally intended by General Scott, or if deferred until dawn of day, his dispositions should have been materially modified. With a fine veteran division we think a night attack would have succeeded. Suchet's Peninsular Campaigns are full of examples of the success of night attacks against disparity of numbers. The French troops were not superior to the veterans of Worth's division, and the Mexican troops were of the same character with those of Spain. Suchet always succeeded in his night attacks.

In consideration, however, of the somewhat intricate nature and our limited knowledge of the position, we think it was safer to make the attack by daylight. Worth, therefore, we think, ought not to be censured for deferring the attack until dawn of day, but for adhering to dispositions which were proper only for a night attack. He should have kept back his troops altogether, till the enemy were shaken by the fire of his artillery, and then have sent them to the assault. Not simply a select party of five hundred men, but that party followed closely by a veteran brigade, and a light battery, should have pierced the centre of his line.

Then turning to the left, this body in conjunction with another brigade, should have swept the Casa-Matar, the artillery supported by the third brigade all the while playing on the foundry. The cavalry would have maintained our left flank and rear against the enemy's lancers. The Casa-Matar in our hands, against the attack of three brigades, and the whole of his artillery, the foundry could not long have held out. With such dispositions, and with a proper use of his artillery, we think General Worth could have carried the entire position with one third of the loss he actually experienced.

It was certainly a great mistake to push on that isolated column of five hundred men against the enemy's immense force, all the other troops remaining behind in position. Before succor was brought to this little band, four-fifths of their number were killed or wounded. It was a most terrible and unnecessary sacrifice of life.

We consider these grave faults in the preliminary dispositions. The order of battle was of the parallel order, and in the very case where the parallel order should have been avoided. After the storming party was cut up, and driven back, the whole line with strong defensive works was attacked at once by the bayonet. The artillery was not used until the first assaults had failed and until the heavy losses had been experienced. But the battle having been engaged, General Worth deserves great credit for his gallantry and resolution in maintaining the field, and for skilful dispositions in the heat of the contest. The final skill exhibited and success achieved more than redeemed the commencement, and justly entitle him to the favorable judgment of his countrymen. It is simple justice to Worth to state that he advised a general action and the storming of Chapultepec, and that from the first he was of opinion that destroying the foundry would be a more serious operation than was contemplated by General Scott. It was in conse-

quence of this belief, and at his suggestion, that he was reinforced by Cadwalader's brigade.

We regret that our author, in animadverting with great freedom and severity upon General Scott's part in the battle of Molino, should find all of Worth's conduct entitled to eulogium—and that obvious departures from the principles of war should have been entirely overlooked.

We will pass on rapidly to the operations about Chapultepec, commencing with the council of war at Piedad, on the 11th of September. We shall give these operations the more careful attention, as Major Ripley has most laboriously endeavored to make them subserve the elevation of the military reputation of certain subordinate commanders, at the expense of the well-earned fame of the General in Chief.

After the battle of Molino, Worth's division was posted at Tacubaya, and the remainder of the army was cantoned in the villages along the southern front, with a strong advanced post at Piedad.

Whilst the sick and wounded were being transferred to Mixcoac, now become the general dépôt, the enemy's lines on the southern front were reconnoitred by the engineers, and on the 11th General Scott convened a council of officers at Piedad, and submitted his views in reference to the plan of attack against the city.

On this day, as on the two previous days, the enemy were rapidly strengthening their works on the southern front, and had already eleven guns in position.

There were two projects of attack proposed by General Scott and submitted to the council—one was to attack the southern front, the other to attack Chapultepec.

The attack against the southern front, and in close proximity to the city, almost unavoidably involved a prolonged and murderous contest in the streets of the city, and with the small force at the disposal of the American General, there was danger that, exasperated and inflamed by

the remembrance of the sad scenes of Molino, our troops would abandon themselves to pillage, and thus be liable to be cut off in detail.

The attack against Chapultepec, standing boldly out full two miles from the city, would assimilate the contest more to one of the field, and might of itself induce the surrender of the city. It was not to be expected that the force of the enemy, well broken in defence of Chapultepec, could be rallied very effectually in defence of the city. The taking of Chapultepec, moreover, opened the way to an advance on the San Cosme suburb, referred to in a former part of this article as the strategic point of attack. Thus the storming of Chapultepec, besides striking a severe blow upon the enemy at a distance from the city, and snatching from him that place of strength upon which he relied for its defence, opened the way at once to the most vulnerable point.

Most of the officers at the council of Piedad, instead of taking this large view of the two projects of attack, simply considered the relative facility with which the southern line of works, and those about Chapultepec, could be forced. Nor did they much weigh the fact that the enemy were evidently expecting us on the southern front, and that in storming Chapultepec, we might reasonably expect, in prosecuting subsequent operations, to find them unprepared in the Cosme suburb. No one doubted the success of the American arms, whichever project was adopted. But there was a general disposition to exaggerate the strength of Chapultepec. Now, a work on an eminence, with trees and inequalities of ground to its very walls, as was the case with Chapultepec, is the most easy to carry by storm, and the loss to be apprehended is but slight compared to an attack on level and open ground, as on the southern front.

It was pretty evident that General Scott, on assembling the council, had determined to attack Chapultepec, both from the tenor of his opening remarks, and from his having

previously directed sites to be selected for establishing counter batteries, and accordingly the attack was resolved upon, although a majority of his officers inclined to the attack against the southern front.

Thus far no allusion has been made to a demonstration against the southern front in connection with the attack against Chapultepec, for the simple reason that a demonstration against Chapultepec, supported by counter batteries, must have necessarily entered into the plan of an attack against the southern front. A demonstration would have been effective in both attacks, and was not, therefore, a determining circumstance in either.

Our author, taking the same restricted view as did a majority of the officers at the council of Piedad, is of opinion that the southern front of the city was the true point of attack, and, that the southern lines forced, the city would have been in our hands, and the citadel—a strong bastioned work in the southwestern quarter of the city—and Chapultepec, would have fallen by their own weight.

The southern lines forced, as we advanced into the city, we should have been obliged to detach largely to guard our dépôts, and to maintain a firm attitude in front of Chapultepec, occupied in force by the enemy; whereas, Chapultepec forced, a small garrison would have held it, and in the progress against the city, the diverting force at Piedad could have been drawn to the main body.

Thus the southern attack in its subsequent prosecution involved large detachments from the attacking force. The attack against Chapultepec involved an increase of the attacking force, by an incorporation of the diverting force with the main body.

For all these reasons the conclusion of the General in Chief was most fortunate.

When the council of war broke up, although the General in Chief was almost alone in favor of operating against

Chapultepec, the utmost ardor and confidence was infused among the officers who were present, and soon, throughout the army.

The spirit of the army, at first somewhat depressed by the losses of Molino, had been gradually rising, and it now reached its highest point of exaltation. Not for a single moment had the General in Chief been otherwise than vigilant, cool and self-sustained, never doubting our ultimate triumph, and not for a single moment had either his officers or his men a doubt as to his safely leading them through the perils that encompassed them.

The plan of attack against Chapultepec, was to counter-batter with heavy metal, until an impression was made on the defences and the morale of the garrison was well shaken, and then to carry it by storm. It was to be supported by a bold demonstration against the southern front on the part of Twiggs (Riley's brigade), at Piedad.

Accordingly, the remainder of the army (excepting Smith's brigade), on the evening of the 11th, was concentrated at Tacubaya, and all the batteries but one were got in readiness during the night, and opened their fire in the morning. The battery referred to did not open its fire till towards night, in consequence of delays in furnishing working parties; and not, as stated by Major Ripley, in consequence of the severity of the fire rendering it impracticable to work.

The necessary scaling-ladders were collected early in the day, and the plan of attack was definitely settled. There were to be two main columns of attack, consisting of the respective commands of Generals Pillow and Quitman, each furnished with a storming party of two hundred and fifty men, from the veteran divisions of Worth and Twiggs.

Chapultepec, in reference to the entire line of the enemy in view of the American army, was but a point. Nearly one half the Mexican army could be kept in the lines in

immediate proximity to the city, by a single brigade. This left disposable for the attack of Chapultepec seven-eighths of the American army. The ground was more unfavorable for the development of troops in the defence than in the attack. The attack pushed with vigor and resolution, the enemy would have found it difficult to bring to its defence one half his force, and still more difficult to apply it.

Towards night, Gen. Scott summoned Generals Pillow and Quitman to his quarters, to arrange the plan of attack.

The plan consisted essentially in moving down on the two sides of Chapultepec, and seizing the point of junction of the two roads of communication with the city, thus completely isolating this important position; and then, in conjunction with a movement of one of Pillow's brigades from the Molino, through the Cypress Grove, to storm the work itself.

Pillow made many objections to this plan, and expressed great fears as to his division being able to do the work that was assigned to it. He particularly objected to the division of his command, and was of opinion, that a single brigade was not sufficient to storm Chapultepec from the direction of the Cypress Grove. Gen. Scott showed that this was the weak point of the position; that the difficulties of the advance were very much magnified, and that in conjunction with the other movements, a single brigade only was necessary. Finally, Gen. Pillow, after yielding objection after objection, stated his willingness to make the attack if his whole division was given to him, to which Gen. Scott assented.

The plan of attack was therefore so modified, that Gen. Pillow's whole division was to be sent to the storming of Chapultepec, from the Molino and through the Cypress Grove, and Gen. Quitman's command was to move down on the Tacubaya road, and seize the batteries at its base.

At early dawn, all the batteries opened a vigorous fire

upon the enemy. Smith's brigade was withdrawn from Piedad to reinforce Quitman; and Worth's entire division was advanced to the Molino, to be held in readiness for contingencies. Pillow was authorized to call upon Worth for reinforcements.

At about 8 o'clock, the batteries ceased their fire by order of the General in Chief, and the two commands advanced to the assault.

Our troops showed great ardor, and eagerly pushed forward on both lines. Pillow and Quitman were both at the heads of their commands. The resistance of the enemy was obstinate. But after a fierce contest of one hour's continuance, Chapultepec was seized, and the enemy were driven from the entire position, with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Quitman on the direct Tacubaya causeway, and Worth on the causeway leading to the western suburb of San Cosme, followed in pursuit; Pillow, early wounded in the assault on Chapultepec, having been disabled for the rest of the day.

After a protracted contest, in which Quitman exhibited remarkable energy, force, and gallantry, he seized at half-past one, the gate of Belen; but directly in front of the citadel exposed to a tremendous fire of the enemy, he was unable to continue his advance, and was obliged to take shelter till nightfall. Worth—pausing in his advance to the Cosme suburb, in order to lend a hand to Quitman, hotly pressed on the Tacubaya causeway—finally advanced and seized the field-work at the junction of the road from Chapultepec and the Cosme causeway, and the western end of the suburb itself, at about half past twelve, and awaited the coming up of the engineer and ordnance trains, to prosecute his further advance into the city. Resorting in part to the pick, and in part to artillery and the bayonet, at nightfall he was well advanced into the city, a majority of his command lodging within the Garita. During the night,

both Quitman and Worth made preparations to renew the attack in the morning, and Worth threw some shells into the centre of the city.

Santa Anna withdrew his troops during the night, and took up a position at Guadalupe, some two or three miles distant.

The next morning the main plaza, and the national palace were occupied early by Quitman's command, Worth having received orders to advance no farther than the Alameda ; and the General in Chief declining in the night to listen to the proposition of the City Council, to surrender on terms, announced in an order his occupancy of the Mexican capital.

Still a desultory contest was kept up throughout the day from the houses of the city, by an intermingled body of soldiers and leperos led on by officers of the army, and was only stopped by the vigorous measures of the General in Chief, who ordered every house to be blown up from which a hostile shot should be fired, and every Mexican with arms in his hands to be put to death.

Santa Anna, finding his plan of inciting our troops to pillage, by the natural exasperation of the street contest thus referred to, had signally failed, and that there was no chance of his being able to surprise them when abandoned to drunkenness and disorder, after waiting two or three days at Guadalupe, divided his command. With a portion he repaired to Puebla to try his fortune against Childs, the governor of that place, and to watch his opportunity to fall upon our reinforcements coming up from Vera Cruz. The remainder—a disorderly mob—repaired to Queretero, where the government was to be temporarily established.

Both the city and valley of Mexico were now in undisputed possession of our troops.

We will refer the reader for a more minute description of the splendid operations of the day of Chapultepec, to

Ripley's narrative; it is correct in its details, and is in the main to be relied on.

We regret to be obliged to disapprove the whole spirit of his criticisms of these operations. Had it been his professed object to depreciate as much as possible the services of General Scott, he could not have said less in his behalf. Had it been his professed object to give the most favorable view of the conduct and services of Generals Worth and Pillow, he could not have said more.

But to the criticisms themselves :

1. Pillow's disposition of his troops for the assault and his management in prosecuting it, are spoken of in terms of the most unqualified praise.

Let us examine these dispositions a little in detail.

Pillow objected to a separation of his division—the sending of one brigade to the rear of Chapultepec in conjunction with Quitman to cut it off entirely from the city and to prevent the throwing in of reinforcements—and the sending of the other to the direct assault through the Cypress Grove, and was allowed, at his urgent solicitation, to apply his whole command to the accomplishment of this latter purpose. Yet, what disposition does he make? We use the words of the author: “The battalions of the eleventh and fourteenth regiments, and the two pieces of Magruder's battery, all under Colonel Tronsdale, were posted at the north-western angle of Molino del Rey for the double purpose of watching Alvarez, and the position of Pena-y-Barragan on the northern road of the Aqueduct. Except under a contingency, this corps were to be held in position until the castle fell, but in case reinforcements were seen to be entering the castle, it was to engage them at all hazards.”

In other words, Pillow, though supported by the whole of Worth's division, instead of applying the whole of his division to the work of storming Chapultepec, actually placed nearly the whole of one of his brigades in observa-

tion, with orders, however, to engage the enemy in case he was seen to be entering the castle. Scott's plan was promptly to advance the brigade, to prevent all possibility of throwing in reinforcements.

In the progress of the attack, Pillow, deeming a reinforcement necessary, instead of calling to his aid those regiments left in observation, called for one of Worth's brigades. Thus, though he objected to the division of his own command, he had no objection to dividing Worth's.

But we in substance quote still farther :

"Tronsdale, believing he saw reinforcements enter the castle, advanced two pieces of Magruder's battery and the fourteenth infantry to support it. Worth arrived at the angle whilst the fire upon Jackson's section and the fourteenth infantry was continued and heavy. He ordered Captain Magruder to withdraw the pieces, and threw a portion of Garland's brigade to the left of the road, to take the barricades in flank. These troops came in as the enemy retreated, and the point was carried. This having been accomplished, the ditch was filled up, and the artillery and troops of the command were advanced along the designated route, in pursuit." Now, whilst Pillow was still making his way in the Cypress Grove, and Quitman was struggling along the causeway, the enemy making an obstinate resistance on both points, General Scott, fully expecting that General Pillow had used his division as he had asked to use it, ordered Worth to send one of his brigades around Chapultepec to relieve both Pillow and Quitman. This order, though distinctly heard by Worth, was not promptly carried out. He observed that before he moved a brigade in that direction, he wished to know more of the ground. Hence the late movement of its execution, as above. Now, if it was a proper disposition of Pillow to place two of his regiments in observation to be ready to attack the enemy in the act of throwing in reinforcements, and if it was right

for Tronsdale thus to apply his force and for Worth to sustain him in it, most surely it was right for Scott in an earlier stage of the contest to order the advance of Worth, when in addition to providing against this contingency, he certainly relieved both Pillow and Quitman, hotly pressed. Yet, Major Ripley says in the first place, that the order was probably never given. 2d. That it was a perfectly useless order if given; and, 3d, that General Worth, at all events, made no attempt to execute it. We think that every unprejudiced reader cannot fail to agree with us in opinion, that this is pretty rapid criticism.

2. But we will take a more extended view of these operations.

The whole southern and southwestern front of the city, of which Chapultepec was the point of attack in the operations against the city, was to the whole army what the southwestern front of Chapultepec was to Pillow's division. What was the relative course of the Commander in Chief and his subordinate?

Against that single strategic point, General Scott directed the force of his whole army, excepting one brigade, which boldly faced the remainder of the enemy's extended line, and diverted nearly one half of the enemy's force.

Pillow left two of his regiments in his rear, to act as a picket—a duty to which, one would suppose, the whole of Worth's division was adequate. And then finding his force inadequate, instead of calling them to his aid, he asks for a brigade of Worth's. Scott, seeing from his position at Tacubaya that both he and Quitman were hotly engaged with the enemy, and that the enemy were making a hot resistance, at this critical moment orders Worth to strike the other flank and create a diversion in favor of both.

If it were wrong for Gen. Scott, to whom the whole of Chapultepec was the *point* of attack, to order a whole brigade to move on one of its flanks, and which otherwise

could not be brought into action, it was surely a violation of the rules of art, for Gen. Pillow, to whom the southwestern front was the *line* of attack, to send two of his regiments in another direction, whilst complaining of the inadequacy of his division.

Our author has much to say about bringing a preponderating force to bear upon the decisive point. What was the relative course of the General in Chief and his subordinate in their respective spheres? The General in Chief brought to bear upon his decisive point, Chapultepec, seven-eighths of his whole force, with which he proposed to attack on all sides, leaving none of his battalions out.

Pillow's whole sphere of operations was the southwestern front of Chapultepec. Yet, instead of directing his whole force to the decisive point of that front, in his first dispositions, he left nearly one half of his command entirely out of his sphere of operations, assigning to them a duty which the General in Chief had in view for Worth.

Yet Major Ripley contends, that Gen. Scott violated that great principle of the military art, of bringing a preponderating force to bear on the decisive point, and that Gen. Pillow illustrated it.

The whole gist of Major Ripley's criticisms, as was that of Gen. Pillow's defence before the court of inquiry, is, that Scott was an indifferent spectator of the attack on Chapultepec, a mile-and-a-half in rear, in Tacubaya—and that Pillow was entitled to the chief merit, both of the plan of attack and its execution.

In truth, it is pretty evident that Pillow was ambitious of the whole honor of the western attack; and it does not seem an illiberal criticism to say, that he made his arrangements with a special view of making Worth's operations entirely subordinate to his own.

How else can we account for the separation of his command, sending but little more than one-half to the attack of

the western front, and leaving the remainder at the north-western angle of Molino to remain in observation, or to attack according to circumstances, when Worth's entire division was in close proximity? Why was he not content to apply his division to its special work? The General in Chief acted on the presumption that Pillow had applied his division to the work assigned it; nor did he dream that Pillow, after objecting to a separation of his brigades, had actually separated them in his subsequent dispositions.

The General in Chief, then, applied a preponderating force—or seven-eighths of his entire command to the decisive point. His subordinate leaves out of his sphere of operations entirely, nearly one half of his command.

We quote again: "All the moral force of the American army was restored at the moment when Pillow's victorious troops crossed the parapet of Chapultepec, and in the pride and exaltation of the moment, none doubted that the great victory of the war had been accomplished, and that the final object of the campaign was within reach. The various jealousies which had place in the American army at a later date, had no place then; and the congratulations of friends, the acclaiming shouts of the soldiery, as the commander of the western attack was borne wounded into the castle of Chapultepec, which had been the end of his dispositions and his efforts; and the commendations of the General in Chief soon afterwards, told at that time of the importance of the capture, and to whom its glory belonged."

We will save the real services of Gen. Pillow from the depreciation which must result from such ridiculous exaggerations as the above. He had a simple executive duty to perform in the storming of Chapultepec, and he did it well. We think his disposition of that portion of his command, which he applied to that work, was good. He indeed made use of just about the force that could be applied advantageously, namely, one brigade. Had his other brigade been

disposed of as a support, leaving Worth's division entire, his arrangements would have been very complete.

Whilst, therefore, we feel bound to rebuke the attempt to manufacture a great commander out of Pillow, we bear witness to his zeal, vigor, and gallantry, and we do not hesitate to say, that had his friends possessed the virtue of silence, his former mistakes would have been passed over as the natural result of inexperience, and no one would have been found to gainsay his having deserved well of his country. We think he earned the reputation of a good executive officer; but this has been withheld from him in consequence of the attempts that have been made to exalt his reputation at the expense of his commander. The endeavors to raise him above his proper level, have caused him to sink much below it.

It may be asked, why did not Scott persist in his original design of promptly advancing a strong force on either side of Chapultepec, seizing its communication with the city, and cutting off reinforcements, making it, to use his own words, feel its isolation? Why did he suspend the advance on the road running north of Chapultepec, in order that Pillow might move through the Cypress Grove with his whole division? We answer, Gen. Scott knew it was the prime condition of success, that the particular commanders should have confidence in themselves. And he yielded to Pillow, to insure that the success of Pillow's division, so far as it depended on Pillow himself having confidence that it would succeed, should not be left to chance. Moreover, Gen. Scott did persist in his original designs; for we see that in a few moments after the battle commenced, and as soon as the enemy's attention is fixed on Pillow and Quitman, Worth is ordered to strike the other flank.

We will bestow a few words on our author's criticisms as regards Worth and Quitman.

Without dwelling further upon Worth's want of promptness in attacking the other flank of Chapultepec, when Pillow and Quitman were hotly pressed, we have a remark to make on the following observation of our author :

"The subsequent movements, both on the Belen and San Cosme road, had the great element of success—celerity. Worth's movements were such as might have been expected of him in the pursuit of the victory. They were characterized by celerity, until celerity became incompatible with prudence, and, meanwhile, by a careful observation of the points of the whole field of operations."

Now, what are the facts? Worth halted his division for one hour and a half on the road leading to the San Cosme suburb, its head being within some six hundred yards of a strong field work at the junction of the two roads. He halted it against the remonstrances of at least one officer of his staff, who informed him that the enemy had no guns then, but if he delayed, they would bring guns, and sweep away the head of his column with grape. He delayed it, in spite of the repeated orders of the General in Chief to push forward. And for what object? To succor Quitman by sending Duncan's battery, and an infantry force, to take the enemy in front of Quitman in flank. That it had this effect we have no doubt. But the most efficient mode for Worth to succor Quitman was to push forward on his own line. He would have found the enemy utterly unprepared; and he would have appeared in force at the western entrance, and would have advanced almost unresisted to the rear of the citadel, before the terrible fire of that citadel had compelled Quitman to bow his head, and keep to cover for the remainder of the day. We venture the opinion that the city would have been evacuated early in the afternoon.

The division of Quitman, on the contrary, was pushed forward with unexampled vigor; first by Shields, though wounded, turning the head of the command in the direction

of the Belen gate, immediately on the fall of Chapultepec, and by Quitman bringing up the remainder, and joining the advance half way to the city. Yes ; with such vigor and resolution was this attack prosecuted, that no one of Scott's staff officers, sent out one after another with information that the Cosme suburb was the real point of attack, were either able or thought it advisable to deliver the order. The division was hotly engaged, and no other course remained than to fight it out.

Thus it happened in the chapter of accidents, that the demonstration was converted into a real attack, and the real attack was for a time simply a demonstration—a demonstration putting the division in imminent peril, endangering the defeat of the plans of the General in Chief, involving much unnecessary delay, giving time to the enemy to bring up his guns, and to dispute the advance of Worth's division into the city.

Worth was greatly afflicted by the losses of his division at Molino, and was in consequence admonished of the necessity of knowing thoroughly his ground, and of incurring no risks. He was on the thirteenth extremely solicitous about the safety of his troops. But excepting his delay at Chapultepec, and his still more reprehensible delay in advancing upon the Cosme suburb, his operations were characterized by sound judgment, and were exceedingly creditable to him.

Worth was indeed a gallant soldier, of splendid manners, of quick apprehension, zealous, indefatigable, energetic—himself fertile in suggestions, and prompt to avail himself of the suggestions of others. He has now gone to his long home. To the state has he rendered eminent service, and let the state ever hold his memory in grateful remembrance.

Quitman's conduct on the day of the storming of Chapultepec, is worthy of the highest praise. His sustained

energy, his prompt decision, his dauntless bearing, and the terrible ordeal through which he pushed his command, are proofs of his possessing some of the highest qualities of an executive officer.

Our author to the contrary notwithstanding, General Scott was the master-spirit of the operations about Chapultepec. It was due, under Providence, to his cool head and steady hand, that our little army was conducted in safety through these scenes of deadly peril. He is equally to be commended for his resolution in determining to attack Chapultepec against the advice of a majority of his officers, and for his dispositions in prosecuting that attack. All those who had an opportunity to observe him on the day of the thirteenth, will remember his remarkable coolness, steadiness and grasp of the entire field of operations.

General Scott, in this campaign, combined two qualities in an eminent degree—qualities seldom united, yet indispensable to a great commander the quality of adhering to his plans, always carefully weighed and thoroughly digested, with great pertinacity, so long as the circumstances remained the same, with great facility in incorporating new circumstances, and changing his plans to conform thereto. This is exemplified in the battle of Churubusco. It was fought on the spur of the moment, without any matured plan, yet the dispositions made were no less complete and masterly than the carefully organized plan of operations which, commencing with the storming of Chapultepec, resulted the next day in the fall of the capital. The whole campaign was characterized by largeness of view and exactitude of execution. But the heroic element predominated over all others, both in the general and his troops. Without it we could not have succeeded.

We will close this article by submitting our own views of the causes of the success of the American arms in Mexico. This is necessary in consequence of the erroneous ideas that

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pervade the public mind as to the qualities required, both on the part of soldiers and commanders, to insure success, ideas that Major Ripley's work has rather tended to confirm than to correct. The impression left on the mind of his reader is, that the battles in Mexico were fought and won, simply in consequence of the good conduct of the subordinate officers and the men, and that whoever had been in chief command the result would doubtless have been the same. This is totally wrong. Nothing is ever accomplished without a directing head; and in no position are cool judgment, a large grasp of the whole field of operations, and a will that shall rise superior to partial and timid views, so much needed as in command of an army. Nor is this all. It is a most mistaken idea that a knowledge of what is technically called the military art is alone essential. It is only a subordinate quality. It is impossible to conduct large military operations without the possession of the same civil and administrative qualities, which are required to govern a state or rule an empire. I unhesitatingly refer to the whole history of the world in proof of this. Alexander conquered the world, because in addition to that great soul and that extended knowledge which enabled him to direct his Greeks with such signal skill and success, he was the most consummate statesman of his age. Without the possession of the same qualities, Wellington would early have been driven from Spain, and the famous Italian campaigns of Napoleon would yet have to be written. Washington was so eminently fitted to conduct his countrymen through the war of Independence, from his happy blending of civil and military qualities. And this is the secret of the miserable failure of many military men, whose reputations, once almost colossal, have long since departed. They have been able to shine on a battle-field, and to exhibit constancy and conduct in the vicissitudes of a campaign, but when risen to high command they have failed, because they knew not

how to pacificate a state, to impress law and order upon a people that had succumbed to their arms.

It was the exceeding good fortune of the American people, that their chiefs in Mexico were men remarkable for their qualities of administration. Indeed, as regards both Taylor and Scott, it would seem, that the secret of all their successes was to be found in the possession of one quality—judgment. They had the power of grasping and weighing and understanding their whole field. The careful observer and thinker cannot fail to see that this large faculty, the growth and fruit of a noble soul and a large intellect, would have caused both to have been distinguished in almost any sphere. They strike us as not particularly military men, but as having succeeded in their military operations simply in consequence of the application of large faculties in a military direction.

Whilst, therefore, we insist that the largest element in our success was the able direction of our force, we concur with every thing Major Ripley says in praise of the subordinate officers and men. They were worthy of and nobly seconded their chiefs.

But the statesmen at the head of our government are entitled to a large share of the gratitude of posterity, for these astonishing successes. They had faith in American progress, and in the great destinies in reserve for the American people. They entered upon the discharge of their duties with the fixed determination to promote the honor and renown of their country. Their whole force was applied to administering the government with entire fidelity to its interests, its wants, and the great laws of its progress. They cordially supported our generals in the field, though these generals belonged to the conservative party in politics. The exertions of Gov. Marcy to this effect were not only unsparing, but his success was so complete as to make his administration an epoch in the history of the war department.

No war in our history, no war in English history, has exhibited such a union of ability and good faith on the part of the government, whose duty it was to point out the general object to be accomplished and to supply the means, and on the part of the generals, whose duty it was to apply the means to the accomplishment of the desired object. The correspondence of the War Department especially, will command the admiration of all reflecting men, for its unsurpassed ability. We have felt obliged in justice to the truth, to animadvert with some severity upon portions of Marcy's reply to Scott. But to his great ability, his incorruptible integrity, we shall ever bear willing and grateful testimony.

Indeed, as regards the American people, its government and its army, there was but one voice, one hand. Without this union in sentiment and in action, we could not have achieved so large a measure of success.

But Mexico too had able leaders, a brave and loyal people. All authority was in the hands of one man. Santa Anna, trained in her war of Independence, and having a large experience in civil duties, was fully equal to the command of a large army, and to the direction of varied and difficult operations. His success in developing and thrice re-organizing the resources of his country, after the successive disasters of Monterey, Buena Vista, and Cerro Gordo, are conclusive as to his extended genius for administration. As a strategist he was certainly not inferior to either of his great antagonists, and his enemies are compelled to bear witness to his personal conduct on the field of battle. The protracted resistance of Churubusco, and the stern front of Belen and of Cosme, were due to his personal exertions. In defeat and vicissitude, he showed admirable constancy and a heroic spirit. His occupancy of Orazava, after the disaster of Cerro Gordo, his abandonment of civil trusts, and his march upon Puebla,

after having been driven from the valley, remind us of Marius sitting on the ruins of Carthage.

A critical examination of his whole management of the Mexican war will show that he is deserving the gratitude of his countrymen, and the respect of his antagonists. In the valley of Mexico, the earlier defeats were due to a positive disobedience of his orders by Valencia; and after the armistice, his only mistake was in offering his flank to our blow at Molino. The defences of the city were arranged with judgment. They were well provided with armaments. The Mexican troops not only thrice outnumbered the American army, but they were brave troops, who fought hopefully for their country, and died manfully at their posts. We must therefore consider another element that was the main cause of our success.

That element is the disparity of races. We prevailed over the Mexicans for the same reasons that the Greeks conquered Persia. The Persians were brave, high-spirited, proud of their ancient prowess, and confident that they were invincible against a world. Yet the troops prepared by Philip of Macedon prevailed in every encounter, and Alexander died at thirty-two the master of the world. The people of Asia were living on their past renown, and were in the full fruition of the accumulations of past generations. They succumbed to a people having a future which they were resolved to achieve.

So of the people of Mexico. Their future is in their past. They have neither the spirit of enterprise, nor the individuality of the people of the United States. They have not had our two hundred years of discipline and of culture, in the full enjoyment of regulated liberty. Originally a military despotism, they have sadly fallen away from the stern virtues of the men of Cortez, and still suffer from military license, without receiving the protection which should be guaranteed by military authority.

The people of the United States, always free, always living under a government of their own choice, have attained a development in all the elements that make a people great that has never been approached. They have great destinies before them. We warn our countrymen that in future wars, discipline, skill, conduct, are indispensable elements of success. That an army may accomplish the greatest things, each man must feel that on his single arm rests the victory, yet the whole mass must move as one man. We must surpass the chosen troops of all other powers in all those things which tend to make men effective, as well as in the men themselves. Our military establishments must be cherished, arms be deemed a great and noble profession, improvements be encouraged, and a nucleus be maintained upon which we can rely in time of war. Otherwise we shall be shamefully beaten in our first campaigns with those great powers, with whom we shall one day be brought in collision, in consequence of their endeavoring to obstruct our rapid march to greatness, and thus injury be done to the honor and glory of our country. At this moment our army organization is much inferior to those of the other great powers. Let our army be cherished, let an organization be effected, based on our own experience, and which shall be the natural product of our own glorious free institutions. It will be superior to all existing organizations, and we shall surpass the world in arms as in arts, in war as well as peace.

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